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I. Introduction
The movement for reparations to the descendants of American slaves
is a volatile topic that invokes passionate responses. Popularly, arguments
for reparations have been characterized by confrontation and demands.
However, this approach is problematic because it alienates potential allies,
including members of the Black community itself. The confrontation
approach is also problematic in that it is over-inclusive of the Whites owing a
debt and the Blacks having suffered a harm. It is significant that many
whites in America are not descendants from slave owners, their ancestors
having arrived on these shores after slavery and even the Jim Crow era.
Likewise, many Blacks are not descendants of slaves, but of free Africans.
Furthermore, the traditional demand for monetary reparations, a one-time
payment to particular Blacks, does not right the wrong.
And yet, it is unconscionable that such a devastatingly tragic event
and the resulting discrimination should go unacknowledged, the effects
brushed aside. In regard to the effects, African-Americans continue to suffer
with respect to education, property ownership, and gainful employment
opportunities;' African-Americans are subject to forms of discrimination that
Whites do not experience. The history of African-Americans in the United
States is intertwined with the institution of slavery. Since the abolition of
slavery, amidst racially oppressive laws and legally supported segregation,
former slaves and their descendants have sought compensation for the
wrongs perpetrated against them. To date, despite advocates from the
political arena,2 attempts to secure legislative redress have been futile.
Further, the current litigation strategy is flawed.
This Note argues that slavery triggered the Fifth Amendment
Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution and presents a more successful
argument on which to support a lawsuit than tort claims. Slaves, like the rest
of White society, possessed a property right of self-ownership. When the
government appropriated that right, slaves suffered uncompensated physical
and regulatory takings. Slaves are thus constitutionally entitled to
I See infra notes 238-49 and accompanying text (discussing the derivative effects of slavery on
African-Americans today with the use of statistical comparisons between Whites and Blacks according to
several social yardsticks).
2 John Conyers (Rep. D. Mich.) introduced a bill in 1989 that would have established a
committee to study the effects of slavery and recommend appropriate remedies if any should be
forthcoming. The bill never made it out of committee. Conyers has reintroduced the bill nearly every
Congressional session since 1989. Each time, the bill has died in committee. H.R. 3745, 101st Cong.
(1989); H.R. 1684, 102d Cong. (1991); H.R. 40, 103d Cong. (1993); H.R. 891, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R.
40, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 40, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 40, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 40, 108th Cong.
(2003).
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compensation under the Takings Clause.3 The descendants of slaves, having
suffered discrimination, a direct vestige of slavery, are likewise entitled to
compensation because this discrimination constitutes a derivative taking.
Part II of this Note identifies the flawed approach currently used in
efforts to obtain reparations and proposes solutions to those problems. Part
III sets forth the concept of the slaves' self-ownership and highlights the
institution of slavery as a federally sanctioned tradition. Part IV discusses
the Takings Clause as a legal theory for the basis of a lawsuit seeking
reparations for slavery, but also for present societal discrimination. Part V
considers the history of compensation.
11. Litigation Flaws
Since 1992, there have been at least six legal proceedings demanding
reparations for slavery.4 Though there is at least one other case,5 these cases
3 I would like to clarify that any reference to compensation and reparations is not to be confused
with a demand for monetary awards. I believe the form of reparation must be more meaningful, more
permanent than money, which according to statistics, African-Americans are less likely to save or invest.
Rather, I believe the form should be any program that would offer long term incentives and benefits, such
as a free college education. Such an offer would give young African-Americans and their parents a reason
to approach the world differently. If they knew college was possible, that their hard work would pay off, I
believe they would be motivated to participate and compete. This suggested solution does not offer
instant gratification, the perceived goal of most reparation litigation. But after careful consideration, it
must be understood that monetary awards, whether in the form of tax breaks or a check, are simply
fiscally impossible and entirely unlikely as a political matter. Obviously, any suggestion for the
advancement of African-Americans would need to be structured such that certain entities in society could
not simply counter with a ridiculous roadblock such as changing college entrance requirements to some
unobtainable bar or a similar obstruction. I find it ironic that the Court has embraced with gusto the
concept of "reverse discrimination," as a roadblock of considerable proportions to exercising affirmative
action as it was intended. It is amazing that after several hundred years of class-based discrimination
against African-Americans, the Court is unwilling to hold that a class-based remedy is permissible. It is
perhaps even more likely that the country could simply acknowledge its compliance in establishing and
maintaining slavery and apologize. This would address concerns regarding the fairness of paying for
wrongs against persons long-dead, while acknowledging harm to their descendants. However, whether an
apology would satisfy demands for reparations and end the matter could be the subject of more extensive
discussion and presently will not be expounded upon further.
4 In re African-American Slave Descendents Litigation, 304 F. Supp. 2d 1027 (N.D. Ill. 2004) is
a consolidated case consisting of Barber v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., No. 02-CV-2084 (D.N.J. May 2, 2002),
Farmer-Paellmann v. FleetBoston Financial Corp., CV-02-1862 (Mar. 26, 2002), Carrington v.
FleetBoston Financial Corp., No. CV-02-1863 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2002), and Madison v. FleetBoston
Financial Corp., No. CV-02-1864 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2002). All of these are class action lawsuits on
behalf of all African-American descendants of slaves presenting claims for conspiracy, human rights
violations, conversion, and unjust enrichment, and a demand for accounting.
5 Bell v. United States, No. 3:01-CV-0338-D, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14812 (N.D. Tex. July 10,
2001). The pro se plaintiff, also a state inmate, sued the federal government, alleging that it illegally
enslaved and committed inhumane crimes against his African-American ancestors. Id. at *2-3. The
inmate sought damages, injunctive relief, and a temporary restraining order for his immediate transfer to
federal custody. Id. at *3. The magistrate judge undertook a sua sponte review of the complaint and
dismissed the claim with prejudice as frivolous, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b).
Id. at *2, *7.
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are to be distinguished as the most thoughtful, approaches in achieving
recognition of the harms directed toward African-Americans. Nevertheless,
these cases have failed to convince a court that their claims, are legitimate
and substantial enough to survive a motion to dismiss. Of the six cases, Cato
v. United States6 encompasses every mistake the others share to one degree
or another. Consequently, Cato will serve as the vehicle.for analyzing the
litigation flaws preventing African-Americans from gaining reparations for
the harms perpetrated by the federal government.
A. Cato v. United States: The Ultimate Failure
1. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California for abuse of discretion regarding its § 1915(d)
dismissal. 7  Cato8 contended: 1) that the dismissal of her action was
premature because she was given neither the opportunity to be heard
regarding the adequacy of her complaint, nor the occasion to amend it, and
that the complaint should not have been dismissed merely because the court
doubted her ability to prevail; 9 2) that the district court's dismissal on statute
of limitations grounds was error because her action was based on statutory
and constitutional prohibitions,'I thus she need not allege discrimination
within any particular time period because the discrimination suffered was a
continuing act;" 3) she had standing because the Thirteenth Amendment
created a national right to be free from the badges of slavery and the Federal
Tort Claims Act (FTCA) provides for relief when the government fails to
perform a duty; 12 and 4) that sovereign immunity did not bar her action
because a) the government can be sued directly under the Thirteenth
Amendment, b) there are theories of relief available under the FTCA, and c)
the government waives its sovereign immunity whenever Congress has
6 Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 1995). The plaintiffs included Jewel Cato, Joyce
Cato, Howard Cato, Edward Cato, Leerma Patterson, Charles Patterson, and Bobbie Trice Johnson.
Collectively the case is referred to a "Cato."
7 Id. at 1106.
8 Id. at 1105 n. 1. The Cato case began with four plaintiffs. It was joined with the Johnson case
which consisted of three other plaintiffs. Since Cato was the only named individual to sign the complaint
and the informa pauperis declaration, and Johnson was the only such plaintiff in her action, the district
court dismissed the other plaintiffs as a non-attorney may appear only on her own behalf. Both Cato and
Johnson were represented by counsel on appeal.
9 Id. at 1107-08.
to Id. at 1108. Cato identifies the Thirteenth Amendment has having created a national right for
African-Americans to be free of the badges and indicia of slavery.
11 Id. at 1107-08.
12 Id. at 1109.
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explicitly .provided aprivate right of action in a statute or through legislative
history. 3
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court, finding that the
complaint could not be cured by amendment. 14 The court stated that it did
not read the district court's order as dismissing Cato's complaint due to
doubts about her ability to succeed. 15 Rather, the court determined that Cato
had not met her burden of showing a waiver of sovereign immunity and that
her claims were not legally cognizable because she raised "a 'policy
question' which the judiciary has neither the authority nor wisdom to
address."'1
6
In making the statute of limitations argument, Cato analogized the
constitutional wrongs against African-Americans to the statutory wrongs
against Native Americans. 17 Cato argued that because courts have recently
addressed hundred-year old claims by Native Americans based on the Indian
Trade and Intercourse Acts, they should do the same for African-Americans'
constitutional violation claims.' 8  The district court had held that it did not
have subject matter jurisdiction as a result of finding that Cato did not show
a waiver of the government's sovereign immunity.' 9 The Ninth Circuit
agreed and stated that it consequently did not need to consider the statute of
limitations argument.20  The court dismissed Cato's "continuing violations
doctrine" against the statute of limitations for the same reason.2'
In regard to Cato's argument against immunity, the court of appeals
noted that, to the extent that Oneida Indian Nation v. New Yore 2 can be
13 Id. at 1108, 1110-11.
14 Id. at I1105.
15 Id. at 1106.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 1107-08 (citing Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. New York, 691 F.2d 1070 (2d
Cir. 1982)).Is Id. at 1108.
'9 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id. "We have.., recognized the doctrine.... However, it can't create jurisdiction or help
overcome jurisdictional hurdles."
22 Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. New York, 691 F.2d 1070 (2d Cir. 1982). The plaintiffs
filed suit alleging that the acquisition by the defendant of tribal land was invalid. Id. at 1073. The Second
Circuit affirmed the portion of the lower court's order dismissing the plaintiffs' claims that the lands were
held in trust by the defendant. Id. at 1095. The court held there was no evidence that state treaties placed
the lands in trust. Id. However, the court held that the sale of tribal land was in violation of the Articles
of Confederation, the Proclamation of September 22, 1783, and the 1784 Treaty of Fort Stanwix, and thus
required further evidentiary proceedings. Id. at 1084-92. The court ruled that an evidentiary hearing was
required because there were conflicts concerning the historical evidence used to interpret the language of
the statutory authority. Id. at 1086. The court affirmed the dismissal of defendant's assertions that the
plaintiffs' claims were time barred, as the federal government explicitly provided for the late filing of
Indian property right actions. Id. at 1083-84. The court also held that defendant was not immune from
suit, as the states surrendered their sovereignty in the regulation of commerce with Indian tribes. Id. at
1079-80.
12 WASH. &LEE J. CR. & Soc. JUST. 1 (2005)
distinguished, it did not turn on a claim of statutory or constitutional
prohibition.23 Rather, it was decided on the basis of a fiduciary relationship
that courts have recognized to run from the federal government to the tribes
as a result of specific treaty and statutory obligations.24 Because neither the
Thirteenth Amendment nor any combination of the Civil War Amendments
created a similar relationship between the government and African-
Americans, the court noted that there was no basis for relieving Cato of the
need to show that the government consented to being sued.
Cato also cited § 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment to argue that the
government was obligated to enact legislation to enforce § 1 because
otherwise the amendment would be meaningless.26 She then argued that,
according to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics,27 when a constitutional right has been violated and there is no
explicit declaration barring suit, an action for damages against the
government may lie.28 She inferred from this that Congress had waived
sovereign immunity.29 The Ninth Circuit disagreed, stating that the U.S.
Supreme Court had declined to extend the Bivens rationale beyond individual
employees to actions against the government, and the United States simply
was not liable for constitutional tort claims.3°
23 Cato, 70 F.3d at 1108.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 1110
27 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971). In Bivens, the petitioner filed a complaint alleging that the agents, acting under federal authority,
entered his apartment and arrested him for alleged narcotics violations. Id. at 839. The agents manacled
the petitioner, threatened to arrest the entire family, and then searched the apartment. Id. Thereafter, the
petitioner was taken to the federal courthouse where he was interrogated, booked, and subjected to a
visual strip search. Id. The petitioner filed suit claiming the Bureau conducted an unlawful search and
arrest in violation of U.S. Const. amend. IV. Id. The District Court dismissed the complaint on the
ground that it failed to state a cause of action. Id. at 390. The Court of Appeals affirmed on that basis.
Id. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari. Id. The federal agents argued that petitioner's right to
damages for an invasion of the state-created right to privacy was available only in a state court applying
state law and thus they should stand before state law as private citizens if a constitutional violation was
found. Id. at 390-91. The Court disagreed, saying that the relationship between federal agents, acting
unconstitutionally, and a private citizen differed from that between private citizens. Id. at 391. Because
the agents had a far greater capacity for harm, the Court reasoned, the Fourth Amendment limited the
exercise of federal power. Id. The Court explained that the Amendment did not proscribe only those acts
engaged in by private citizens that were condemned by state law, but that the interests of state laws
regulating invasion of privacy and the Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable searches could be
inconsistent, and that the awarding of damages to the petitioner following a violation of the Amendment
by federal agents was a remedy normally available in the federal courts. Id. at 392-96. The Court
reversed and remanded because a federal remedy for an unlawful search and arrest allegedly in violation
of the Fourth Amendment was not limited to conduct condemned by state law. Id. 397-98.
28 Cato, 70 F.3dat 110.
29 Id.
30 Id.
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The court also found that under well-established principles, Cato
lacked standing to pursue her claims."' The court noted that Cato tried to
proceed on a generalized, class-based grievance, but that she did not allege
that any conduct had run afoul of any constitutional or statutory right by any
specific official.32 To have standing, admonished the court, Cato should
have alleged personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly
unlawful conduct that could likely be redressed by the relief sought.33
Additionally, the court noted that Cato failed to trace the presence of
discrimination and its harm to the government.34 Furthermore, Cato's FTCA
claim was irrelevant because the statute does not apply to any claim "based
upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee
of the government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused. 3 5
Finally, the court of appeals stated that although 5 U.S.C. § 702 would have
waived immunity for suit against the United States where a suit requests non-
monetary relief, Cato did not have standing to seek relief at all. 6
Consequently, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint with prejudice pursuant to
§ 1915(d). 7
2. Cato's Mistakes
Cato made four notable blunders: 1) she failed to identify specific
parties; 2) she failed to overcome the statute of limitations; 3) she failed to
show a waiver or inapplicability of sovereign immunity; and 4) she sought an
unsubstantiated and unrealistic remedy. A solution to each problem is
discussed at length below.
a. Standing
Standing requires a plaintiff to show that his injury is separate and
distinct from that of the public at large and that the harm in question is
traceable to some wrongful action of the defendant.38 Indeed, in the most
recent reparations case, In re African-American Slave Descendents
31 Id. at 1109.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id. at I1110.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 1111.
37 Id.
38 Richard A. Epstein, The Jurisprudence of Slavery Reparations: The Case Against Black
Reparations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1177, 1179 (2004).
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Litigation,39 an Illinois District Court rejected the plaintiffs' claims as
impossible to overcome because they demonstrated too tenuous a personal
stake in the alleged dispute. 0 The Cato court was of the same opinion.4'
But even reparations critic Richard Epstein believes this is false and that
standing is not a legitimate obstacle.
4 2
In his recent article, Epstein notes that the traditional standing test
requiring discrete injury is inappropriate in cases where the plaintiff seeks to
enjoin the government from reaching beyond the scope of its power.43
Indeed, that is the point in a Takings Clause-based reparation argument. In
such a case, the plaintiff is arguing that the federal government extended
beyond the scope of its authority in allowing, and indeed encouraging, the
taking of private property without just compensation. Not even the federal
government can ignore the Constitution. In cases of equity where the
government has extended beyond its constitutional boundaries, all the
members of the relevant class stand in the same position to the wrongdoer,
such that one individual may become the spokesman, if you will, for the
entire group.44 Such cases, states Epstein, must have as their objective the
protection against actions that are conducted in violation of structural
limitations contained in the Constitution.45 These violations go unredressed
unless someone is able to step into the shoes of those who were unable to
represent themselves. Though neither the litigants in the African-American
Slave Descendents Litigation nor Cato fit this situation because neither is
based on a constitutional claim, a Fifth Amendment Takings Clause
argument would suit this constitutional violation requirement.
Epstein even argues that derivative actions seeking damages should
be allowed because actions of this sort are akin to actions of loss of
consortium brought by a spouse or a child, or a wrongful death action
brought by a descendent under a tort theory.46
There are a number of other ways to avoid a standing issue if the
action is against a state or a private individual or corporation. In Hurdle v.
FleetBoston Financial Corp. ,4' the plaintiffs identified state statutes that
39 In re African-American Slave Descendents Litigation, 304 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1047 (N.D. Ill.
2004) ° Id.
41 Cato, 70 F.3d at 1109-10.




46 Id. at 1081.
47 Hurdle v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., No. 02-CV-4653 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2003). Hurdle was a
class action lawsuit on behalf of all African-American descendants of slaves against various corporations
claiming violations of the Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 and demanding an accounting.
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48allow the complainant to sue for any type of fraudulent business practice.
Likewise, focusing on Jim Crow legislation identifies a discrete number of
plaintiffs, avoiding the standing issue altogether. The most recent cases have
had no problem identifying defendants.49 Indeed, in Cato, the defendants
accused the plaintiff of proceeding on a generalized, class-based grievance
because she did not identify or even suggest either the parties seeking relief
or those from whom relief was sought.5° The plaintiffs in Alexander v.
Governor of Oklahoma,5 1 on the other hand, filed suit for reparations that
even state agencies had already admitted were due.52 In their complaint, the
plaintiffs identified specific parties including the Governor, the city, the chief
of police, and the police department, alleging civil rights claims under 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985. 53 They also brought claims under the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause.54 Finally, the
plaintiffs submitted state law claims based on negligence and promissory
estoppel.55
Although the Tenth Circuit ultimately found that the plaintiffs were
barred by the statute of limitations,56 a similar approach to reparations would
be appropriate where the harms are relatively recent and easy to identify and
the suit can be limited to state and municipal actors. This allows for focus
on the government entities that should be held responsible for the official
policies of discrimination endorsed by the nation as a whole.
48 Id.
49 In re African-American Slave Descendents Litigation, 304 F. Supp. 2d 1027 (2004). In re
African-American Slave Descendents Litigation is a consolidated case consisting of Johnson v. Aetna Life
Ins. Co., No. 02-2712 (E.D. La. Sept. 3, 2002), Barber v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., No. 02-CV-2084 (D.N.J.
May 2, 2002), Farmer-Paelmann v. FleetBoston Financial Corp., CV-02-1862 (Mar. 26, 2002),
Carrington v. FleetBoston Financial Corp., CV-02-1862 (Mar. 26, 2002), Madison v. FleetBoston
Financial Corp., CV-02-1862 (Mar. 26, 2002). All of these are class action lawsuits on behalf of all
African-American descendants of slaves presenting claims for conspiracy, human rights violations,
conversion, and unjust enrichment, and a demand for accounting.50 Cato, 70 F.3d at 1109-11!.
51 Alexander v. Governor of Oklahoma, 391 F.3d 1155 (10th Cir. 2004). In Alexander, a Black
teenager accused of assaulting a white female was arrested. Id at 3. Rumors of a lynching brought
Blacks to the jail to protect him. Id. A gun was discharged, and a riot ensued. Id. The Blacks retreated,
followed by the whites who indiscriminately fired machine guns at people and homes. Id. Although the
Governor called for the National Guard, the isolation of Blacks only allowed the whites to bum their
unprotected homes, a total of forty two square acres. Id. at 3-4. The court held that the statute of
limitations had run and the time could not be tolled as a result of the plaintiffs' failure to show the
government actively concealed necessary information, id. at 21-25, and detrimental reliance on the




55 Id. at 5-6.
56 Id.
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b. Statute of Limitations
According to Epstein's article, the statute of limitations is an
impregnable obstacle that should remain so to prevent courts from making
bad law on other issues that could spill over into cases that have little or
nothing to do with reparations.57 The thrust of his argument is based on the
notion that reparations does not qualify for a tolling exception.5 8 Even if one
were to toll the statute for the sake of slavery (when the victims were unable
to bring suits on their own behalf) Epstein says the statute began to run in
1865. 59 He argues that the subsequent segregation should not be tolled at all
because segregation did not limit the right to bring suit, though it may have
lessened any complainant's chances of winning.60 Furthermore, Epstein
asserts that the reparations cases do not represent cases where the plaintiff
did not suffer an injury until years after the defendant's action and neither are
these cases of concealment or of continuing wrong. 6' He concludes that not
only are most cases in which the statute of limitations tolled seeking the
return on a tangible, easily valuated object,62 but there is a discrete class of
people, easily identifiable for distribution.63
Despite the strong convictions that are the basis of his perspective,
Epstein could not be more mistaken regarding various aspects of the nature
of slavery and discrimination reparations. Equitable remedies tolling the
statute of limitations are routinely available where filing suit is untimely due
to the defendant's affirmative misconduct or because the relevant facts are
unavailable to plaintiffs through no fault of their own.64 Equitable estoppel
"hinges on the defendant's representations or other conduct that prevents the
plaintiff from suing before the statute of limitations has run,, 65 and is
required where the defendant's affirmative misconduct undermines fairness
or justice in its dealings with its citizens.66
57 Epstein, supra note 38, at 1183, 1187.
58 Id. at 1184-87.
59 Id. at 1184.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 1186.
63 Id. at 1185-86. Although Japanese Americans have received reparations for the internment of
their ancestors was not based on figures of tangible loss, he does not take issue with such payments.
6 See Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. 231, 232-33 (1959) (stating that "no man
may take advantage of his own wrong"). The Court also noted that "[d]eeply rooted in our jurisprudence,
this principle has been applied in many diverse classes of cases by both law and equity courts and has
frequently been employed to bar inequitable reliance on statute of limitations." Id.
65 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1056
(3d ed. 2002).
66 See Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford County, Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 60-61 (1984)
(stating that when a government agents' conduct has given rise to an estoppel, the interest of the citizenry
as a whole in obedience to the rule of law is undermined). The Court noted that at least two of its cases
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Proponents of reparations should argue that African-Americans were
in no condition to bring a claim on their own behalf, given their status after
the Civil War. Post Civil War conditions, including political
disenfranchisement, lack of education, impoverished conditions, de facto
discrimination, and institutionalized segregation prevented former slaves and
their descendants from bringing a claim. Moreover, even if these victims did
have the wherewithal to contemplate a suit, there were few Black lawyers
and even fewer White lawyers who would have taken their case.
Additionally, there was little chance the plaintiffs would have found a court
capable or willing to judge the case on its merits.67 Epstein argues that the
fact they would have lost is not important, because it has happened to others
before.68 If there is no equal opportunity to be heard regarding the merits of
one's case, what is the purpose of having access to the legal system at all?
The notion of giving someone the right to complain but deciding the
outcome of the case on anything but the law prevents redress of wrongs,
destroys the possibility of corrective action, and thus flies in the face of
justice. The entire justice system might as well be dismantled.
Furthermore, the limitations period should be equitably tolled
because the purpose underlying the statute of limitations is not served. The
rationale behind the statute of limitations, that at some point a legal
controversy will end so that the defendant may have a fair opportunity to
defend himself before memories fade and evidence becomes stale, is
inapplicable. To the contrary, where evidence was unavailable to the
plaintiffs and has only recently been rediscovered through the defendants'
actions, the defendants should not be able to escape legal responsibility for
the crime identified.69  The courts have already indicated a willingness to
accept such an argument.70  According to these cases, the statute of
rest on the premise that when the government acts in misleading ways, it may not enforce the law if to do
so would harm a private party as a result of governmental deception. Id. at 61.
67 Cases like Loving v. Va., 388 U.S. 1 (1967), Brown v. Bd of Educ., 348 U.S. 886 (1954),
Strauder v. W. Va., 100 U.S. 303 (1879), and Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879) are clear indications
that equality in the judicial system and the legislature simply did not exist and this would have prevented
any perspective claimant from seeking reparations.
6 Epstein, supra note 38, at 1184.
69 Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 50 (2002) ("[W]here the claimant has actively pursued
his judicial remedies by filing a defective pleading during the statutory period, or where the complainant
has been induced or tricked by his adversary's misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass.").
70 See, e.g., Bodner v. Banque Paribas, 114 F. Supp. 2d 117, 134-35 (E.D.N.Y. 2000)
("Furthermore, plaintiffs could hardly have been expected to bring these claims at the end of World War
II, and claim they have been consistently thwarted in their attempts to recover funds and information from
defendant banks."). The court concluded that "[a]s such, the statute of limitation has been tolled from
running and plaintiffs' claims are not time-barred." Id; Rosner v. United States, 231 F. Supp. 2d 1202,
1209 (S.D. Fla. 2002) ("In addition, the Court notes that, for the majority of Plaintiffs, the years following
World War II were particularly difficult."). The court concluded that "[t]his, combined with the fact that
the Government cannot benefit from its own alleged misconduct, tips the balance in favor of tolling the
limitations period." Id.
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limitations is to be tolled when there is: 1) violent repression, followed by; 2)
active concealment of relevant facts surrounding the history of the
repression;7' and 3) an officially sanctioned study that uncovers the truth of
that repression.72
Opponents will respond that the end of the Civil War brought about
the Freedman's Bureau 73 and the NAACP, 74 organizations designed to
improve Blacks' conditions, thereby eliminating the need for any kind of
reparation. Such an opponent would do well to remember that the
Freedman's Bureau was staffed by biased locals and limited in its
accomplishments.75 Although the Bureau may have been successful in
assuring equality in process, it was not successful in assuring equality in
results. Furthermore, the election of 1876 brought an early end to
76 beasReconstruction, not because Congress was satisfied the freed slaves had
been established as full and equal citizens, but because of Southern political
scandal 77 and Northern miscalculation. 78  Any harms the Bureau had been
established to address were forgotten and a new hostility took its place. The
NAACP, although a formidable grassroots organization in its efforts to
promote social justice, is not a federal program, and thus lacks the full
71 Bodner, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 135-36 ("[D]eceptive and unscrupulous deprivation of both assets
and of information substantiating plaintiffs' ... rights to these assets."); Rosner, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 1209
("[T]he Government essentially turned a deaf ear to Plaintiffs' repeated requests for information about
their property.").
72 Bodner, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 123. A French government commission, comprised of historians,
diplomats, lawyers, and magistrates, studied the circumstances of how goods were illicitly acquired and
made recommendations. Id.; Rosner, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 1209. It was only when the "'Presidential
Advisory Commission on Holocaust Assets released its report on the Gold Train' that the facts necessary
to file their Complaint came to light." Id. (quoting Complaint 90).
73 Reginald Washington, From Slavery to Freedom: Preserving the Records of the Freedman's
Bureau, http://www.archives.gov/about-us/calendar-of events/features/jan-feb_2002_feature.html (Jan.
2002). The Bureau issued food and clothing, operated hospitals and refugee camps, established schools,
helped freedmen legalize marriages, supervised labor contracts, and worked with African-American
soldiers and sailors and their heirs to secure back pay, bounty payments, and pensions.
74 NAACP Timeline, http://www.naacp.org/past-future/naacptimeline.shtml (last visited Oct. 13,
2005). On February 12, 1909, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People was
founded by a multiracial group of activists, and began its legacy of fighting legal battles addressing social
injustice.
75 W.E.B. DuBois, The Freedmen's Bureau, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, vol. 87, Issue 521, Mar.
1901, at 358, 363, available at http://cdl.library.cornell.edu/cgi-bin/moa/moa-cgi?notisid=ABK2934-
0087-50 (last visited Oct. 12, 2004). Discusses the difficulties of finding help when men were still
working for the military, when those available to help were of questionable character, the creation of
Black schools and securing the recognition of Blacks before courts, but noting that it failed to fashion a
workable relationship between once slave holders and newly freed slaves, discouraged self-reliance, and
failed to enable large scale landownership among the freed slaves.
76 Hayes v. Tilden: The Electoral College Controversy of 1876-1877, http://elections.harpweek.
com/9Controversy/Overview-controversy-1 .htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2005).
77 Id.
78 Id.
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political and legislative backing and financial support of the federal
government.
Epstein's concern regarding who and how many people should take
part in any kind of distribution is unnecessary to discuss at this time. 79 That
matter in and of itself would require extensive discussion. However, it is
worth stating that the difficulties surrounding distribution should not dictate
whether a case for reparations is legitimate. A case for reparations hinges on
justice and righting past wrongs that continue to have a detrimental effect on
African-Americans.
c. Doctrine of Laches
The doctrine of laches holds that equity aids the vigilant and not
those who procrastinate; neglecting to assert a right or claim will, together
with lapse of time and other circumstances, prejudice an adverse party.8°
Neglecting to do what should or could have been done to assert a claim or
right for an unreasonable and unjustified time creates this disadvantage. 81
Laches is similar to the statute of limitations except that it is equitable rather
than statutory, and is a common affirmative defense raised in civil actions.82
Nevertheless, laches may be excused because of: 1) ignorance regarding the
party's rights; 2) the obscurity of the transaction; 3) the pendency of a suit;
and 4) where the party labors under a legal disability such as insanity or
infancy.83
Opponents of reparations argue that African-Americans today are
simply too far removed from those who suffered any actual harm, and thus
the claim for reparations is too tenuous.84 In response, proponents must rely
on common law, which limits a laches defense when it is used to defeat a
public interest.8 5 The public interest being threatened is the right each citizen
has to the protections of their government and the right to relief under laws
designed to provide recourse for wrongs committed against them.
A plaintiff could also respond that the delay was not due to lack of
diligence or neglect, but due to a concentrated effort to limit access to the
legal system and political and economic disenfranchisement as a result of
79 Epstein, supra note 38, at 1185-86.
80 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES, EQUITY, RESTITUTION § 2.4(4) (2d ed. 1993).
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR, CIVIL RIGHTS DIv., INDEX TO ADMIN.
DECISIONS, UNDER SECTION 503 OF THE REHAB. ACT OF 1973, TOPIC 103: LACHES,
http://www.oalj.dol.gov/public/ofccp/refrnc/ocdigl30.htm. (last revised Nov. 1996).
84 David Horowitz, Ten Reasons Why Reparations for Blacks Is a Bad Idea for Blacks--and
Racist Too!, http://www.adversity.net/reparations/anti-reparations-ad.htrn (Mar. 12, 2001).
85 DOBBS, supra note 80, at 509.
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Jim Crow laws. In addition, one could argue that the federal government
should be precluded from asserting a laches defense because the government
contributed to the lack of access to the legal system that was necessary to the
expeditious exercising of one's rights to a claim.
d. Government Immunity
To date, the suits for reparation have been claims for tortious acts by
corporations or the federal government. Suits against corporations are
difficult because of the lapse in time. And suits against the federal
government are nearly impossible because the federal government has to
agree to be sued. Reparations to African-Americans are such a contentious
subject that this is likely never to happen. Cato's only option was to avoid it
altogether, which is possible to do under a tort theory because of the FTCA's
time limitations, even if time was tolled or subject to a similar equitable
exception.
A Takings Clause argument easily sidesteps an immunity defense.
Although the Supreme Court has held that property regulations may
constitute a Fifth Amendment taking of private property, some courts have
nonetheless avoided recognizing the concept of regulatory takings86 by
drawing a distinction between the exercise of a government's eminent
domain power and the exercise of its police power.8 7 These courts have held
that only formal condemnation accomplished through eminent domain
amounts to a Fifth Amendment taking. Any such distinction is an artificial
one however, since both practices allow for the involuntary, and
uncompensated, transfer of private property.
It is significant that the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that the
remedy provision under the Takings Clause is "self-executing '8 and does
86 Mailman Dev. Corp. v. City of Hollywood, 286 So. 2d 614, 615 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
Under the Florida Constitution, no private property shall be taken except for public purposes and with full
compensation to the owner. Id. However, noted the court, there is a clear distinction between the
appropriation of private property for public use in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, and the
regulation of the use of property under the police power exercised to promote the health, morals, and
safety of the community. Id. The enactment of a zoning ordinance under the exercise of police power
does not entitle the property owner to seek compensation for the taking of the property through inverse
condemnation. Id. If the zoning ordinance as applied to the property involved is arbitrary, unreasonable,
discriminatory, or confiscatory, the relief available to the property owner is a judicial determination that
the ordinance is either invalid, or unenforceable as pertains to plaintiffs property. Id.; see Fred French
Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 594 (1976) (finding that the United States Supreme Court's
Mahon opinion only metaphorically equated an invalid exercise of the police power with a taking of
property).
87 Mailman Dev. Corp., 286 So. 2d at 615.
88 See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 315
(1989) (finding that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments required the city to compensate the church for
the period of time of the taking). The Court concluded that city's actions already constituted a taking and,
therefore, no subsequent action by the city could relieve it of the duty to compensate the church. Id.
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not require further legislative action in order to enforce the right. This
remedy provides a direct cause of action. The requirement of compensation
is based in the Constitution and is fundamental to the notion of justice;
government action that expropriates private property rights necessarily
implicates the constitutional obligation for just compensation.
As noted in Justice Brennan's dissent in San Diego Gas & Electric
Co. v. San Diego,90 it has been established since Jacobs v. United States9'
that claims, regardless if they are effectuated by traditional condemnation or
by regulation, for just compensation are grounded in the Constitution itself:
The suits were based on the right to recover just compensation for
property taken by the United States for public use.... That right
was guaranteed by the Constitution. The fact that condemnation
proceedings were not instituted and that the right was asserted in
suits by the owners did not change the essential nature of the
claim. The form of the remedy did not qualify the right. It rested
upon the Fifth Amendment. Statutory recognition was not
necessary. A promise to pay was not necessary. Such a promise
was implied because of the duty to pay imposed by the




90 San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 654 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Respondent city rezoned land, formerly zoned for industrial use, which affected property owned by the
petitioner. Id. at 624. The landowner brought suit for inverse condemnation, id. at 626, and the Court of
Appeals of California, Fourth Appellate District denied damages for inverse condemnation. Id. at
627-30. The U.S. Supreme Court determined that the decision of the court of appeals was not final, so
the Court lacked jurisdiction to consider the question. Id. at 630. A state judgment only created a federal
question when a taking and compensation for the taking were implicated. Id. However, the Court
determined that the evidence showed that a taking had not actually occurred and the landowner's action
was a challenge to legislative activities because the landowner had taken no action that established it had
been deprived of the benefit of its land. Id. Under the circumstances, the appropriate relief was
mandamus or declaratory relief, not compensation for inverse condemnation. Id. at 629. In addition, the
landowner had other remedies before the state courts. Id. at 632. The Court dismissed the landowner's
appeal. Id.
91 Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933). In Jacobs, the petitioners' lands were damaged
from an increase in the occasional overflows of an adjacent creek caused by the government's
construction of a dam. Id. at 15. The petitioners filed suit to recover compensation for the property taken,
under the Fifth Amendment, and were awarded the amount of damage caused by the construction
commencing on the date of the dam's completion, excluding interest from the date of the government's
taking. Id. The Supreme Court reversed the latter part of the lower court's decision, holding that interest
was recoverable. Id. at 16. Since the petitioners' actions were founded upon the Constitution rather than
an implied contract, the government's promise to pay was implied by the duty to pay imposed by the
Constitution. Id. Therefore, the petitioners were entitled to just compensation, determined by the value of
their property at the time of the taking and to such additions as would produce the full equivalent of that
value paid contemporaneously with the taking; interest "is a good measure by which to ascertain the
amount so to be added." Id. at 16-17.
92 First English Evangelical, 482 U.S. at 315 (citing Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 16
(1933)).
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Justice Brennan interpreted the just compensation requirement as
barring the government from forcing some individuals to bear burdens that
should be borne by the public as a whole.93 Because the public receives
benefits from the regulations, Justice Brennan believed it only fair that the
public bear the cost of receiving those benefits when the burden of providing
them is so severe that the property being regulated has been taken.94 He
pointed out that, from the perspective of the property owner, it matters little
if the property is formally condemned or merely regulated to an
unconstitutional extent.95 The end result is that the public is receiving
benefits at the sole expense of the owner unless the government tenders just
compensation.96 The Court has frequently repeated the view that, in the
event of a taking, compensation is required by the Constitution.97
The judicial branch is not alone in recognizing the Fifth
Amendment's unique, self-executing quality. President Reagan issued
Executive Order 12,63098 following the Supreme Court decisions in Nollan
v. California Coastal Commission99 and First English Evangelical Lutheran
93 San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 656 (1981).
94 Id.
95 Id. at 652.
96 Id.
97 First English Evangelical, 482 U.S. at 315; see Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467
U.S. 1, 5 (1984) (indicating that 40 U.S.C. § 258a empowers the Government, "at any time before
judgment" in a condemnation suit, to file "a declaration of taking signed by the authority empowered by
law to acquire the lands [in question], declaring that said lands are thereby taken for the use of the United
States"). The Government is obliged, at the time of the filing, to deposit in the court, "to the use of the
persons entitled thereto," an amount of money equal to the estimated value of the land. Id. Title and right
to possession thereupon vest immediately in the United States. Id. In subsequent judicial proceedings,
the exact value of the land is determined, and the owner is awarded the difference between the adjudicated
value of the land and the amount already received by the owner, plus interest on that difference. Id.; see
also Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299, 304-06 (1923) (noting that Section 10 of
the Lever Act authorizes the taking of property for the public use on payment of just compensation).
There is no provision in respect of interest. Id. Just compensation is provided for by the Constitution and
the right to it cannot be taken away by statute. Id. Its ascertainment is a judicial function. Id.;
Monongahela Navigation v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 337 (1893) ("Of the power of Congress to
condemn whatever land may be necessary for such canal, there can be no question; and of the equal
necessity of paying full compensation for all private property taken there can be as little doubt.").
98 Governmental Actions and Interference with Constitutionally Protected Property Rights, Exec.
Order No. 12,630, 53 Fed. Reg. 8859, 8862 (Mar. 18, 1988).
99 Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). In Nollan, Appellant landowners
brought suit to invalidate a condition on their land permit requiring them to grant the public an easement
across their beachfront property. Id. at 828. The court of appeals found the condition to be valid and
reversed the writ of mandamus issued by the superior court. Id. at 830. The United States Supreme Court
granted review and found that the right to exclude others from private property was an essential right to
the ownership of property. Id. at 831. If government action resulted in permanent occupation of land, it
would effect a taking unless it substantially furthered legitimate state interests. Id. at 834. The Court
found that California required the use of eminent domain to obtain easements across private property and
the condition imposed was not a use of eminent domain. Id. at 841. The Court finally held that the
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Church v. Los Angeles County.'0° The Order recognized that the Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause is self-executing and requires that Executive




To establish slavery as a taking, one must recognize that slaves had a
property interest in their persons. The Supreme Court itself, at the height of
the U.S. slave trade, acknowledged that every man has a natural right to the
fruits of his own labor. 10 2 The fact that no one can deprive him of this fruit,
and appropriate it against his will, is a necessary result of this admission.10 3
Philosophers recognized and relied upon by the Framers in developing the
Constitution,' 4 such as Locke, have long discussed the idea that bodily
integrity may be an independent right.'05
condition was a taking and that, if the state wanted an easement, it would have to compensate appellants.
Id. at 842.
10o First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
Appellant property owner filed a complaint after appellee county adopted an ordinance in response to a
flood that destroyed a portion of appellant's property. Id. at 307-08. The complaint sought to recover in
inverse condemnation and sought damages for the loss of use of a portion of the property. Id. at 308. The
trial court found in favor of appellee county and the appellate court affirmed, holding that appellant could
not recover for damages for the time before it was finally determined that the regulation constituted a
taking ofappellant's property. Id. at 309. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision. Id.
at 310. The Court found that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments required that the appellee compensate
appellant for that period of time. Id.
101 Governmental Actions and Interference with Constitutionally Protected Property Rights, 53
Fed. Reg. at 8862.
102 The Antelope, 23 U.S. 66, 120 (1825).
103 Id.
104 See LAURENCE TRIBE & MICHAEL DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 70-71 (1991)
(discussing Locke as "one of the most influential thinkers for American statesmen" of the eighteenth
century); see also Jeffrey S. Koehlinger, Substantive Due Process Analysis and the Lockean Liberal
Tradition: Rethinking the Modern Privacy Cases, 65 IND. L.J. 723, 758-59 (1990) (noting that Locke's
liberal traditions inspired early United States leaders).
105 See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 67-68 (Prometheus Books 1988) (1651) (stating that there
are rights that no one can be presumed to have abandoned or transferred, and the loss of which would
defeat the original purpose of the contract). For example, no one can be regarded as having laid down his
right to resist anyone who attempts to take away his life, "because he cannot be understood to aim thereby
at any good to himself." Id. Hobbes outlined the conflict between 1) the absolute right of the sovereign
(his natural right to do anything, which he retains by virtue of having been outside the contract), and 2)
the citizen's basic right of self-defense, which he had not renounced when entering into the contract.);
JOHN LOCKE, Second Treatise on Government, in PRINCETON READINGS IN POLITICAL THOUGHT:
ESSENTIAL TEXTS SINCE PLATO 243-44 (Mitchell Cohen et al., eds. 1996) (asserting that every human
being holds absolute natural rights). The government does not grant these rights, but rather individuals
give up some of their natural rights in order for the government to protect their lives, liberty, and property.
Id. The major thrust of his work argues that individuals have rights protecting their autonomy and
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Locke stated thai a man's property included his life, liberty, and
estate.'1 6 He included life and liberty as elements of property.'17 For Locke,
one primary purpose of establishing government was for the protection of
this fundamental right to property, including self-ownership. 0 8 Although the
right of self-ownership is subject to limitations, one's property in one's self,
stated Locke, is inalienable.'09
Nearly all the Framers owned slaves-Jefferson owned as many as
200 slaves" 0  and Locke himself penned the pro-slavery Carolina
constitution."' But even James Madison argued that property "embraces
everything to which a man may attach a value and have a right."'"12 He also
stated that a man has an important property interest in the safety and liberty
of his person, that he has an equal property interest in the free use and
application of his faculties, and that as a man is said to have a right to his
property, he may also be said to have a property interest in his rights.'
Although legal scholars typically accept only a minimal definition of
self-ownership," l4  a more expansive perspective exists to define self-
property. Id. Government intrusions can only be legitimated by the consent of the governed; the
government has no independent right to contravene individuals' rights other than those they freely give
up. Id. These ideas of freedom from government intrusion are clearly identifiable throughout the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights. Supreme Court opinions reaffirm Locke's principles of protection of
personal autonomy and bodily integrity; see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (determining
that the "right of privacy, whether it be found in the Fourteenth Amendment.. .or.. .in the Ninth
Amendment..., is broad enough to encompass a decision whether or not to terminate the pregnancy");
Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479,485-86 (1965) (asserting that laws prohibiting the use of contraceptives
are unconstitutional); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942) (holding that an Oklahoma law
calling for the sterilization of repeat felons is unconstitutional). The Court recognized a right to be free
from state intrusion into the bodies of individuals, claiming such an intrusion contradicted the "dignity
and personality" inherent to each person. Id. at 546 (Jackson, J., concurring).
106 LOCKE, supra note 105, at 262.
107 Id.
108 Id. "The great and chief end, therefore, of men's uniting into common-wealths, and putting
themselves under government, is the preservation of their property." Id.
109 Id. at 251. "[E]very man has a property in his own person: this no body has any right to but
himself...." Id.
110 Interview by Ken Burns with Clay Jenkinson, Professor of History and Literature at the
University of Nevada at Reno, Archives: Interview Transcripts, http://www.pbs.org/jefferson/archives/
interviews/Jenkinson.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2005).
II The Avalon Project at Yale Law School, The Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina: March
01, 1669, http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/states/nc05.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2005).
112 James Madison, Property, NAT'L GAZETrE, Mar. 29, 1792, at 174, reprinted in THE LETTERS
AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 480 (1865).
113 Id.
114 See Michelle Bourianoff Bray, Personalizing Personalty: Toward a Property Right in Human
Bodies, 69 TEX. L. REV. 209, 220 (1990) (commenting that currently there is no defined legal position
regarding property rights in the human body). But see YORAM BRAZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
PROPERTY RIGHTS 113 ("The current prohibition of slavery implies that each individual is the owner of
the capital asset embedded in himself or herself.").
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ownership as ownership of one's liberty.'1 5 This ownership is less about the
body and more about the ability to make decisions and control one's
destiny." 6 It is this perspective that relates to constitutional rights of privacy
and integrity. Slaves possessed these rights under both the limited and
expanded definitions of self-ownership.
B. Slavery Was Illegal Before 1865
As early as 1770, a colonial Massachusetts Superior Court found
slavery, pursuant to state common law, to be unconstitutional. 17 In 1783,
the court took steps to further analyze whether slavery was legal under the
Massachusetts Constitution." 8  It found that nowhere did the State
Constitution expressly enact or establish slavery." 9 The Massachusetts court
further held that the idea of slavery was inconsistent with the nation's own
conduct and the Constitution. 120 As a result, there could be no such thing as
perpetual servitude, unless the individual forfeited his liberty as a result of
criminal conduct or by personal consent or contract.121
Prior to these cases, however, the colonies themselves had outlawed
slavery. The Virginia colony, for example, stated that people in the colony
"shall have and enjoy all liberties, franchises and immunities within any of
England's other dominions, to all intents and purposes as if they had been
abiding and born within the realm of England."
22
15 Cheryl Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1709, 724-37 (1993) (discussing the
proposition that American law has recognized a property interest in Whiteness); Margaret Radin,
Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957, 966 (1981) (suggesting that the tort law basis for a
claim of assault is rooted in a property interest that "interference with my body is interference with my
personal property").
116 See Laura Underkuffler, On Property: An Essay, 100 YALE L.J. 127, 136-39 (1990)
(discussing how the works of James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, Joseph Story, and John Locke created
and expanded the notion of man having a property right in his own person).
117 James v. Lechmere (Mass. Superior Ct. 1770) (cited in Lemmon v. People, 20 N.Y. 562
(1860)).
118 Quock Walker Case (Mass. Superior Ct. 1783, unpublished), The Quock Walker Case:
Instructions to the Jury, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/aialpart2/2h38.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2005; see





122 William J. Wood, The Illegal Beginning ofAmerican Negro Slavery, 56 A.B.A. J. (Jan. 1970).
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A number of other colonies wrote charters to the same effect. 23 In
fact, "there were no colonial enactments that authorized the holding of
slaves, or defined the relation and condition of slavery."'124 For example, the
state of Georgia commenced under auspices decidedly hostile to slavery. 25
General James Oglethorpe, a member of the British Parliament, created the
colony with the idea of opening the area for England's poor and for
persecuted Protestants of all nations. 126 As a result, the colony's governing
trustees strictly prohibited slavery, and declared it to be not only immoral,
but contrary to the laws of England.
27
In the late 1700s and into the 1800s, a number of cases emanating
from state courts again held that slavery was unconstitutional. In
Commonwealth v. Jennison,128 the Massachusetts Superior Court found that
slavery had not been expressly enacted or established. In fact, the court
called it "a mere practice," and stated that the Constitution declared all men
were born free and equal, thus slavery was totally repugnant to the nation's
ideologies.
129
In 1837, the Ohio Supreme Court came to the same conclusion,
albeit by different reasoning. The state arrested James Birney for knowingly
harboring a fugitive slave.' 30 In his defense, Birney argued three points: 1)
slavery is unconstitutional, so 2) he could not have harbored a slave, as it
was a non-existent status in law, and 3) certainly could not have done it
knowingly.13 1 The Ohio Supreme Court unanimously ruled in Birney's
123 REV. WILLIAM GOODELL, SLAVERY AND ANTI-SLAVERY: A HISTORY OF THE GREAT
STRUGGLE IN BOTH HEMISPHERES: WITH A VIEW OF THE SLAVERY QUESTION IN THE UNITED STATES 18
(New York, William Harned Pub. 1852). Maryland, the Carolinas, Georgia, New England, and
Pennsylvania wrote charters specifying that the people in the colony shall enjoy all liberties; LYSANDER
SPOONER, UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SLAVERY 21-31 (Boston, Bela Marsh 3rd ed. 1845) (1860)
Maryland, the Carolinas, Georgia, New England, and Pennsylvania wrote charters specifying that the
people in the colony shall enjoy all liberties.
124 GOODELL, supra note 123, at 20-21.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id. (citing MARCIUS WILLSON, AMERICAN HISTORY 261-62 (1846)).
128 Commonwealth v. Jennison (Mass. 1783, unpublished), The Quock Walker Case: Instructions
to the Jury, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/aia/part2/2h38.html; Slavery: Quock Walker, http://www.
masshist.org/longroad/O I slavery/walker.htm. In Jennison, the defendant was indicted and charged with
assault and battery against Walker. Id. The Attorney General argued that Jennison had attacked a free
man, based on testimony that Jennison was aware that Walker's former master had promised him freedom
once he reached the age of 25, a promise that was renewed by the widow. Id. Jennison's lawyer argued
that the 1780 state constitution did not specifically prohibit slavery. Id. In his instructions to the jury,
Chief Justice William Cushing held that the constitution granted rights that were incompatible with
slavery. Id.
129 Id.
130 Ohio v. Bimey, 8 Ohio 230, 237-38 (1837).
131 Id. at 238.
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favor, 132 on the basis that Bimey could not be guilty of the alleged criminal
acts without an averment that he in fact knew his actions were illegal. 133 The
court noted the issue of slavery was too important to discuss if it was not
necessary to resolving the case.
13 4
Cases of this nature are prevalent through this nation's early
history. 35 The question then is how and why slavery persisted. Historians
have proffered a number of arguments ranging from greed 136 to Christian
duty137 to explain the "Why" aspect of this conundrum. Indeed, the truth
may never be known, however, the "How" portion of the mystery is clear.
When the Framers of the Constitution met to mold the principles of
this nation, the issue of slavery arose to confront them, forcing them to
reconcile it with their philosophical ideals of human rights and personal
dignities. Whereas they could have followed English common law,
138
colonial charters, colonial courts, and the principles that stated they
themselves, as Whites, could not be enslaved, they chose instead to
compromise their principles for the sake of political support and regional
peace. It was this newly established federal regime that instituted and
protected slavery. It was the Founders, who proclaimed themselves and all
men free of English tyranny, who created the basis on which states and
private citizens would declare their right to buy and sell other humans like
chattel. The federal government laid the foundation for slavery, for
violations of human rights, for the subsequent discrimination that persists
today, for the sake of politics, 39 federal revenues, 140 and personal comfort of
its political leaders.'
4'
132 Id.; see Hone v. Ammons, 14 Ill. 28, 29 (1852) (acknowledging that the state's Constitution
and court precedent made slavery unconstitutional); State v. Lasselle, I Blackf. 60, 62 (Ind. 1820)
(acknowledging that the state's Constitution and court precedent made slavery unconstitutional);
Stoutenborough v. Haviland, 15 N.J.L. 266 (1836) (questioning the presumption that Blacks were slaves
absent contrary evidence because most Blacks in New Jersey were free).
133 Birney, 8 Ohio at 238.
134 Id.
135 See supra note 132 and accompanying text (discussing illegality of slavery according to state
law).
136 JOHN A. AUPING, RELIGION AND SOCIAL JUSTICE THE CASE OF CHRISTIANITY AND THE
ABOLITION OF SLAVERY IN AMERICA 7-10 (1994); KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION,
385-88 (1956).
137 MARGARET KNIGHT, HONEST TO MAN: CHRISTIAN ETHICS REEXAMINED, 143 (1974); Charles
Bradlaugh, Humanity's Gain From Unbelief in ATHEISM, A READER, 181 (S. T. Joshi ed., 2000).
138 See Somerset v. Stewart, Loffi 1, 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B. 1772) (stating that slavery is
incapable of being legally established for any reason, moral or political, except by written law). The court
notes further that since England had not approved such a law, Somerset had to be freed. Id.
139 WILLIAM K. KLINGAMAN, ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE ROAD TO EMANCIPATION, 1861-65,
at 49-51, 71 (Viking 2001); BENJAMIN QUARLES, LINCOLN AND THE NEGRO 84 (1962).
140 Kevin Outterson, Slave Taxes, in SHOULD AMERICA PAY?: SLAVERY AND THE RAGING
DEBATE ON REPARATIONS 135 (Raymond A. Winbush ed., 2003).
141 See The Founding Fathers: A Brief Overview, http://www.archives.gov/exhibit-hall/
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C. Federal Responsibility
Slavery, as would be defined and practiced by the American
colonists, was virtually non-existent in England in the 18th century.42 In
fact, a mere fifteen years before the Constitutional Convention, the King's
Bench, an early English equivalent to the modem U.S. trial court, presided
over by one of the most important and well-regarded judges of the time,
found that slavery could not be held to exist without positive law.' 43  Since
none existed in England, slaves had to be freed.' 44 Despite the fact that
Somerset v. Stewart 45 should have become a part of American common law,
the absence of institutionalized slavery in England served only to motivate
the colonial governments to pass statutes that created slavery as a legally
protected practice.
46
The federal government went so far as to institutionalize slavery in
its most precious document, even though these provisions would create
incongruence in the document. For example, Article I, § 9 of the
Constitution permitted the federal government to obtain monetary benefits
charters-of freedom/constitution/founding_fathers_overview.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2005) ("Twelve
[signers] owned or managed slave-operated plantations or large farms: Bassett, Blair, Blount, Butler,
Carroll, Jenifer, Mason, Charles Pinckney, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, Rutledge, Spaight, and
Washington. Madison also owned slaves."); see also Sarah Booth Conroy, The Founding Father and His
Slaves, WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 16, 1998, at D02 ("He inherited 10 slaves at his father's death in 1743.
When he died on Dec. 14, 1799, 317 slaves, 123 belonging to Washington himself, lived on his five
plantations.").
142 See William M. Wiecek, The Origins of the Law of Slavery in British North America, 17
CARDOzO L. REv. 1711, 1715-20, 1723-26 (1996) (discussing that while one may be a "villain" or a serf,
in England, one was not a slave; noting, although not completely accurately, that when an African slave
entered England, he was free).
143 Somerset v. Stewart, Loffi 1, 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B. 1772); see Matter of Cartwright, 11
Elizabeth, 2 Rushworth's Coil 468 (1569) (finding slavery unconstitutional and stating, "England was too
pure an air for slaves to breathe in"); Shanley v. Hervey, 2 Eden 126 (Chancery, March 1762) (stating
that "As soon as a man puts foot on English ground, he is free: a Negro may maintain an action against his
master for ill usage, and may have a Habeas Corpus, if restrained of his liberty"); Smith v. Brown &
Cooper, 2 Ld Raym 1274, 2 Salk 666, 91 Eng Rep 566 (1765) (stating that "that as soon as a negro comes
into England, he becomes free: one may be a villein in England, but not a slave").
" Somerset v. Stewart, Lofft 1, 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B. 1772).
145 Id. In Somerset, James Somerset had been sold to Charles Stewart in Jamaica. Stewart took
Somerset to England for some temporary business, intent on taking him back to Jamaica at the close of
that business. Id. While in England, Somerset refused to serve Stewart, intending to stay in England.
Stewart returned Somerset to the custody of the ship they would be returning on. Id. The captain
surrendered Somerset to the authorities. Id. The King's Bench noted an early chancellor's case in which
prevailed the notion that if a slave entered England, he became emancipated. Id. The Bench upheld this
notion, stating that slavery is incapable of being legally established for any reason, moral or political,
except by written law. Id. And since England had not approved such a law, Somerset had to be freed. Id.
14 Colonial Law, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/aia/partl/lh315t.html; Boston African-American
National Historical Site, The Fugitive Slave Law of 1850, http://www.nps.gov/boaf/fugitiveslavelaw2.htm
(last visited Oct. 28, 2005) ("As early as 1643, colonists had recognized a need for the regulation of
fugitive slaves."). In Massachusetts, for example, there was the New England Confederation (1643-1684)
that was founded, in part, to strengthen colonial cooperation in the return of fugitive slaves. Id.
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from slavery. The article states that "a tax or duty may be imposed on such
importation not exceeding ten dollars for each person."147 The plain meaning
of this language indicates that the federal government intended to derive
monetary benefits from the slave trade. The logical extension of this is that
the government, by retaining the authority to tax the traders' property,
recognized the slaves as property, with its authority enforceable under the
Constitution.
Furthermore, Article IV, § 2, clause 3, the Fugitive Slave Clause,
recognized the individual property rights of a slave owner in a slave,
indicating a constitutional protection of slave property. 14  Article IV
implicitly sanctioned the product that flowed from slave property, namely,
slave labor.
149
The Constitution's endorsement of slavery is clear. 150 Just as clearly,
the Fifth Amendment made it a violation to take property without
compensation.'5 ' Existing together, the two concepts are in conflict with one
another. Unless we are to deny the plain meaning of the document's words
as they pertain to slavery or to deny that the Fifth Amendment requires
compensation, it can only mean that the slaves' constitutional rights to own
property were violated and that they are owed compensation for the taking of
their property.
The federal government even used the geographical expansion of the
country as a vehicle for increasing the number of slave states, and ultimately
the number of slaves. The government did this through the Missouri
Compromise, which admitted Missouri as a slave state and Maine as a free
state.'52 This behavior continued into the mid-19th century: between 1821
and 1848 every free state (Michigan, Iowa, and Wisconsin) was countered
with a slave state (Arkansas, Florida, and Texas); 53 the Compromise of 1850
admitted California as a free state in exchange for stricter fugitive slave
147 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
148 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
149 Id. ("No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into
another, shall, in Consequence of Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from Service or Labour, but
shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.").
150 See supra notes 147-149 and accompanying text (indicating the Constitution supported the
institution of slavery). But see Kaimipono David Wenger, Slavery as a Takings Clause Violation, 53 AM.
U.L. REV. 191 (2003) (arguing that the Constitution could not support slavery and that if it did, there
could be no Fifth Amendment takings argument to recover for the uncompensated taking of the slaves'
property).
151 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.").
152 GLOVER MOORE, THE MISSOURI CONTROVERSY, 1819-1821, at 86-88 (1953).
153 DON E. FAHRENBACHER, THE SOUTH AND THREE SECTIONAL CRISES 16-17, 29, 53 (1980);
MICHAEL GANNON, FLORIDA: A SHORT HISTORY 37 (2003); WILLIS FREDERICK DUNBAR, MICHIGAN: A
HISTORY OF THE WOLVERINE STATE 313 (1965); DAVID G. MCCOMB, TEXAS: A MODERN HISTORY 50,
59-60 (1989).
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laws; 154 and the Kansas-Nebraska Act divided the territory such that the
former was a slave state and the latter was a free state.'55 The government
actively ensured the longevity of slavery.
After the federal government adopted slavery, government actors
conducted auctions, included slaves as probate property, allowed them to be
seized as assets, 5 6 and passed regulations facilitating the recapture of
runaway'slaves. 157 The language of the Fugitive Slave Clause itself indicates
that slavery was a creature of statute and regulation.'5
Finally, the Supreme Court itself recognized slavery, stating that the
Framers directly sanctioned slave property. 5 9 This is notable, and when
considering the outcome of Harry v. Decker, 60 supports an argument that the
Court proceeded based on personal biases. In Decker, a case with issues
identical to those in Dred Scott, the Mississippi Supreme Court granted the
slave his freedom.' 6' The fact that the highest court of a slave state would
come to such a conclusion is incredible, but also an indication that even
those states steeped in slave culture could and did recognize limitations to
the institution already prescribed as unconstitutional.
154 GEORGE D. HARMON, ASPECTS OF SLAVERY AND EXPANSION, 1848-60, at 47, 51 (Reprinted
from Vol. 21, No. 4, Jan., 1929 Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society).
155 MICHAEL A. MORRISON, SLAVERY AND THE AMERICAN WEST: THE ECLIPSE OF MANIFEST
DESTINY AND THE COMING OF THE CIVIL WAR 126-54 (1997).
156 See THOMAS MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE LAW, 1619-1860, at 82 (1996)
(chronicling the intestate and testate laws regarding the lineal descent of slaves between family members
upon the death of the slaves' owner).
157 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § I ("No person held
to service or labor in one state, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any
law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of
the party to whom such service or labor may be due.").
158 See U.S. CONST., supra note 148 (indicating that the Fugitive Slave Clause stated that slaves
from each state were held "under the Laws thereof," underscoring that slaves were regulated by law).
159 See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 423 (1856) (stating that if African were citizens, then
they would have the rights and privileges of other citizens, protected by the Constitution). And if states
could limit or restrict these rights, then the Constitution would be without meaning. Id. Citizens would
have no rights other than those the state gave hi and this would be contrary to the ConstitutiorL Id.
Rather, the Constitution guarantees rights that the states cannot deny. Id. And this "makes it absolutely
certain that the African race w[as] not included under the name of citizens of a State, and were not in the
contemplation of the framers of the Constitution when these privileges and immunities were provided for
the protection of the citizen in other States." Id. If Africans are not citizens with Constitutionally
protected rights, states are permitted to place them in an inferior position, one sanctioned by the Court.
160 Harry v. Decker & Hopkins, I Miss. (1 Walker) 36 (1818). John Decker took several slaves
from Virginia into Indiana, where slavery is prohibited, for a period of more than 20 years. Id. at 36. The
court noted that though Virginia law guarantees its inhabitants their titles, rights, and liberties, Virginia
cannot render void "that article of the ordinance of Congress of 1787," which prohibits slavery in that
territory. Id. at 37. The court further noted that "[s]lavery is condemned by reason and the laws of nature.
Id. at 42. It exists, and can only exist, through municipal regulations, and in matters of doubt, is it not an
unquestioned rule that courts must lean 'in favorem vite el libertatis'. . . Id. How should the Court
decide...? I presume it would be in favor of liberty." Id. at 43.
161 Id. at 43.
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Despite this, the Supreme Court protected the institution pursuant to
the Fifth Amendment. 62  The Fifth Amendment prohibits the federal
government from depriving a property owner of their property without due
process. 163  The Court reasoned that slave property was similar to other
forms of property and was thus entitled to the same constitutional
protections. 64 The Court subsequently recognized the property right of slave
owners.
IV. Slavery as a Taking
A. Purpose of the Takings (Just Compensation) Clause
It has long been difficult for constitutional lawyers to distinguish
between valid exercises of "police power," valid even though a person may
be less well off than before the regulation, and governmental "takings" that
are not permitted unless monetary compensation is paid. 165  A related
problem, albeit one not discussed in this Note, is how much compensation is
due when property is taken. Despite its complexity, the Fifth Amendment
has become the central constitutional restriction on government confiscation
of private property and nearly all state constitutions contain similar
language.
166
According to one preeminent legal scholar, there are at least five
recognized compensable takings: 1) any physical occupation of real property,
even if for only a limited period; 2) regulations that deny the owner all
economically beneficial use of the property; 3) conditional approval of
improvement to property, where the conditions are unrelated to the
development or when the conditions for approval relate to the development
but are disproportionate to the scope or degree of the problems any
development could cause; 4) expropriation of cash; and 5) regulations that
162 Id. at 450.
163 See supra note 151 (stating that "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation").
164 Sandford, 60 U.S. at 451 ("And if the Constitution recognizes the right of property of the
master in a slave, and makes no distinction between that description of property and other property owned
by a citizen, no tribunal, acting under the authority of the United States, whether it be legislative,
executive, or judicial, has a right to draw such a distinction, or deny to it the benefit of the provisions and
guarantees which have been provided for the protection of private property against the encroachments of
the Government."). The Sandford Court added, "Now, as we have already said in an earlier part of this
opinion, upon a different point, the right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the
Constitution." Id.
165 Frank 1. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of
"Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1167 (1964).
166 ROBERT MELTZ ET AL., THE TAKINGS ISSUE: CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON LAND USE
CONTROL AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 3 (1999).
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greatly impact the economic situation of the owner, the regulation's
consistency with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the general
character of the government's action.1
67
There are a number of theories regarding the purpose of the Takings
Clause. The two theories discussed here qualify slavery as a taking,
mandating compensation.
1. Frank Michelman
Frank Michelman has argued that the Takings Clause offers a way to
adjust transactions that increase societal wealth but decrease the wealth of
particular parties, creating transactions that benefit all parties. 168 He argues
that takings should be evaluated under a utility or a fairness analysis, both of
which support compensation for slavery.
a. Fairness
Compensation for the involuntary transfer of property is appropriate
if redistribution is unfair. 169 Michelman suggests that compensation is
required to achieve fairness under certain circumstances, including ones in
which one party suffers an unusually great harm.170 This analysis dictates
that compensation is appropriate where a societal taking has unequally
impaired liberties, where harm is disproportionately focused on certain
individuals or where "visible reciprocities of burden and benefit" are not
present. 171
Slavery meets each of these compensable alternatives. The taking of
the slaves' property interest in their self-ownership concentrated harm (loss
of identity, decision-making power, lack of physical mobility) on certain
individuals (African-Americans) with no reciprocity (uncompensated labor).
The benefits accrued affected only one group (the slave owner and arguably,
Whites generally), while the other suffered immense harms. The result has
been long term inequities, including the impairment of liberties with respect
to education, property ownership, and employment opportunities. The
fairness analysis therefore provides a takings claim for slavery.
167 Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Expropriatory Intent: Defining the Proper Boundaries of
Substantive Due Process and the Takings Clause, 80 N.C. L. REV. 713, 716 (2002).
168 Michelman, supra note 165, at 1172-83.
169 Id. at 1221.
170 Id.
171 Id.
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b. Utility
Under Michelman's utilitarian analysis, compensation is appropriate
where the negative effect of an action is greater than the cost of
compensation. 72 Michelman argues that it is just to compensate victims
because the risk of exploitation by the majority creates a greater disincentive
for minority parties to contribute to society.173 This compensation is due
where societal actions cause disproportionate burdens to fall on particular
parties, 174 where actions tend to channel benefits and burdens to different
groups, 175 and where there has been capricious behavior on the part of the
maj ority.
176
Slaves, in the sense that they were a powerless minority, had their
self-ownership confiscated by the exploitive majority. This confiscation of
property caused a disproportionate burden to fall on this particular group of
people. Once confiscated, this property created benefits to one group, the
slave traders and slave owners, while harming another group. The fact that
the slaves were grouped together and identified as an inferior race is
evidence of the majority's capricious behavior. The utilitarian analysis, like
the fairness analysis, also provides for takings compensation for slavery.
2. Richard Epstein
Richard Epstein asserts that the Takings Clause exists "to guarantee
a proportionate distribution of gains among the parties from whom the
government took private property.' 77  Like any private actor, the
government should be held accountable for the harms it inflicts on parties for
its own benefit. Epstein further argues that the greater the number of takings,
the greater the wrong.1
78
According to Epstein's approach, the taking of slaves' property
interest in their self-ownership is a compensable taking. If the Takings
Clause was designed to equitably distribute gains from confiscated property,
then slaves should receive compensation to offset the fact they received none
of these gains. The result of this confiscation culminated in a taking.
Epstein's belief that the greater the taking, the greater the wrong, suggests
172 Id. at 1215.
173 Id. at 1216-17.
174 Id. at 1217.
035 Id. at 1218.
176 Id. at 1217.
177 RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
15 (1985).
178 Id. at 94.
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that slavery ought to be compensable, considering the mass confiscation of
property.
B. Takings Clause Violations
The Takings Clause states, "nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation."' 179 A Takings Clause violation claim
has four prerequisites: 1) private property must exist; 2) this property must
be taken by the government; 3) the taking must be for public use; and 4) the
original owner must not have been compensated for the taking.
Elements one and two will be discussed in detail below. Elements
three and four however, are not discussed as thoroughly since their existence
is of little doubt. Clearly the reason for the utilization of slaves was for the
performance of manual labor. This labor ultimately made it possible for the
public to use raw materials that otherwise would not have been produced as
quickly, abundantly, or as cheaply as they were as a result of this "peculiar
institution."'80 The public reaped the benefits of slavery in their daily lives.
The results of slavery manifested themselves in cheaper prices at the market
for individuals and an increased availability in raw materials that allowed
Southern planters to expand their market beyond that of the industrial North,
and into Europe. 181 In addition, the returns allowed plantation owners to
continue to reinvest and expand their production capabilities.
18 2
Economic studies have demonstrated that the Southern economy was
driven by slave labor; one estimate places the slave contribution to the U.S.
economy at $40 million. 183 This sum is in addition to the revenue raised as a
result of the federal and state property taxes on the slaves themselves.
Indeed, one source states that between the colonial era and the Civil War,
slave taxes raised more revenue than any other source.
184
Just as clearly, slaves were not compensated for the taking of their
self-ownership. Although there were promises of "Forty Acres and a Mule"
during the Civil War, by and large, the land and beasts never materialized.
185
Even if they had, it was for payment for the slaves' loyalty and participation
179 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
IS0 Harold D. Woodman, Profitability of Slavery, in DICTIONARY OF AFRO-AMERICAN SLAVERY
592, 595-96 (Randall M. Miller & John David Smith eds., 1997).
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 Complaint and Jury Trial Demand P 10, Farmer-Paellmann v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., No. CV-
02-1862 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2002).
14 OUTTERSON, supra note 140, at 135.
185 ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at 69-71
(1988).
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186in military regiments, not for the illegal taking of their property.' Further,
although it may be tempting for opponents of reparations to argue that
emancipation was in and of itself compensation, restoration of the taken
property is insufficient compensation.1 87 After all, what was taken cannot be
given back with the owner restored as new, as is evident by both the blatant
and subtle racism directed toward African-Americans today.1 8' The taking
continued for too long, resulting in effects too devastating to ignore.
Physical and regulatory takings can be permanent or temporary, but
courts have been reticent to find a temporary invasion of property to be a
taking. 189 They have nevertheless, even if the taking has been only partial,
allowed compensation.'9" Permanency, in terms of the length the
government has occupied the property, does not mean literally forever in the
sense that most people would understand it. 19' What has been permanently
taken is not the property itself, but the value of the property for the term of
the invasion. 92 In at least one case, the Supreme Court has found the length
of the occupancy to be irrelevant if the purpose of the taking was for the
benefit of the owners.' 93  In YMCA v. United States, 94 fairness and justice
186 Id. at 69.
187 See First English Evangelical, 482 U.S. at 321 (concluding that the appellee's actions already
constituted a taking and, therefore, no subsequent action by appellee could relieve it of the duty to
compensate appellant for the period during which the taking was effective); San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at
621 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (refuting the proposition that once a regulatory taking has been
established, mere invalidation or amendment of the regulation is a constitutionally sufficient remedy).
Recognizing that the concept of just compensation is to place the property owner in the same position
monetarily as he would have occupied if the property had not been taken, Justice Brennan declared that
invalidation or amendment of the regulation, unaccompanied by payment of damages, does not
compensate the owner for any economic loss suffered during the time the invalid regulation was in effect.
Id.
88 See infra notes 239-49 and accompanying text (discussing the derivative effects of slavery on
African-Americans today with the use statistical comparisons between Whites and Blacks according to
several social yardsticks).
189 MELTZ, supra note 166, at 124.
190 Id.
19' See Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("As Justice Marshall said
in Loretto: 'when the physical intrusion reaches the extreme form of a permanent physical occupation, a
taking has occurred....'"). "In this context, 'permanent' does not mean forever, or anything like it." Id.
192 MELTZ, supra note 166, at 125.
193 YMCA v. United States, 395 U.S. 85, 92-93, 432-33 n.9 (1969); see Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434-35 (1982) (observing that where governmental action results
in "[a] permanent physical occupation" of the property, by the government itself or by others, the cases
have uniformly found a taking to the extent of the occupation, without regard to whether the action
achieves an important public benefit or has only minimal economic impact on the owner).
194 YMCA, 395 U.S. at 85. In YMCA, the petitioners' buildings were situated next to one another
in Panama. Id. at 86-87. Rioting began and many members of a mob proceeded to petitioners' buildings,
looting and wrecking the interiors. Id. at 87. All of petitioners' buildings were either badly damaged or
destroyed; only one building had been occupied by U.S. troops. Id. at 88. Petitioners brought an action
against respondent, seeking compensation for the damage done to their buildings. Id. Petitioners sought
just compensation under the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 86. The lower court held that the actions of the
U.S. Army did not constitute a "taking" within the meaning of the amendment, and entered summary
12 WASH. &LEEJ. C.R. & Soc. JUST. 1 (2005)
did not require compensation. This is not the case regarding the physical,
regulatory, and derivative takings from African-Americans throughout early
U.S. history. The result of this confiscation culminated in a taking.
Epstein's belief that the greater the taking, the greater the wrong, suggests
that slavery ought to be compensable, considering the mass confiscation of
property.
1. Physical Taking
In first year property law courses, law students are instructed to think
of property as a "bundle of sticks." Physical takings involve the
appropriation of the title to property of one or more of these sticks that
comprise the property owner's interest.' 95 Governmental imposition of an
easement will trigger the Takings Clause, for example. Title remains with
the owner, 196 but the government has nonetheless taken a valuable stick from
the bundle.
The property right of self-ownership is inalienable. Unlike other
property rights, it may not be freely traded, bought, sold, or otherwise treated
as a transferable commodity. To be able to do so would undermine personal
identity and violate our deepest understanding of what it means to be
human. 197 This inalienable nature is not the same as a person's property right
in removed body parts, deemed by at least one court to be an alienable
property right. 
198
judgment in favor of the government. Id. at 86. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision,
holding that the Constitution did not require compensation every time violence aimed against government
officers damaged private property. Id. at 93. The temporary, unplanned occupation of petitioners'
buildings did not constitute sufficiently direct and substantial government involvement to warrant
compensation. Id.
195 United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 278 (2002) (describing the "bundle of sticks" as a
collection of individual rights which, in certain combinations, constitute property); L.A. Zaibert, Real
Estate as Institutional Fact: Towards a Philosophy of Everyday Objects, in AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY 267 (1999).
196 See CATO INSTITUTE, CATO Handbook for Congress: Policy Recommendations for the 108th
Congress, at 2 (discussing what is becoming commonplace event: The government appropriates property
through regulatory takings, reducing the value of the property, but leaves title in the owner), available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hbl08/hbl08-15.pdf (last visited Oct. 13, 2004).
197 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 926-27 (1992) (citing Union Pacific R.R. Co.
v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891), the Court reaffirmed the holding that "no right is held more sacred, or is
more carefully guarded by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and
control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others..."). Throughout this century,
the Court also has held that the fundamental right of privacy protects citizens against governmental
intrusion in such intimate family matters as procreation, child-rearing, marriage, and contraceptive choice.
Id. at 926-27. The Court noted that these cases embody the principle that personal decisions that
profoundly affect bodily integrity, identity, and destiny should be largely beyond the reach of government.
Id. at 927 (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)).
198 Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990). In Moore, the
plaintiff alleged that his physician failed to disclose preexisting research and economic interests in the
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One obstacle to recovering for a taking is the possibility that slavery
was not an institution involving property at all, but was merely a system of
contractual agreements between employers and employees. For this to be
true, however, slavery would have to be the same, or at the very least, similar
to indentured servitude or peonage.
However, unlike slavery, peonage and indentured servitude involve
rights enforceable against specific persons. These rights have traditionally
been associated with contracts. Indentured servants obligate themselves to
another person for a specified length of time. The master's rights of
enforcement were against the person contractually subject to the obligation.
The relationship was often defined based on a debt owed.1 99
Likewise, peons were subject to contractual obligations. No such
contract existed between slaves and slave owners.200 The slaves' existence
was solely at the mercy of the owner. History explains that slave owners
dictated the amount and character of the slaves' food, clothing, and
housing.20  They decided whether the slaves learned to read and write, were
permitted to marry, and the conditions of their "employment"-whether they
were to be a field or house slave.2 °2 Slave owners, as a result of the absence
of positive law prohibiting the murder of slaves, quite literally held the
slaves' lives in their hands.203
Slavery, unlike peonage, is a right enforceable against a large group
of undetermined persons. These rights have been associated with property,
not contracts. In fact, in most jurisdictions, slaves were prohibited from
owning real property, entering into contracts, inheriting property, voting,
marrying, or obtaining an education since all of these required signatures and
the ability to direct one's destiny. Not even the inclusion of slaves into the
cells before obtaining consent to the medical procedures by which they were extracted. Id at 124. The
superior court sustained all of the defendants' demurrers to the third amended complaint, and the court of
appeal reversed. Id. The supreme court held that the complainant stated a cause of action for breach of
the physician's disclosure obligations, but not for conversion, because the plaintiff had no ownership
interest in cells after they left his body. Id. at 136-44. The court remanded the case to the superior court
for further attention to the defendants' remaining demurrers. Id. at 148.
I" In the 18th century, it was typical that an individual would "sell" himself or herself into
indentured servitude in exchange for some benefit. For example, poor Europeans promised their labor to
wealthy soon-to-be-Americans in exchange for the cost of transportation and food associated with the
journey from Europe to the New World. See generally Virginia Places, Acquiring Virginia Land By
"Headright," http://www.virginiaplaces.org/settleland/headright.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2005);
Houghton Mifflin, The Great American History Fact-Finder, http://college.hmco.com/history/readers
comp/gahff/htmVff 088100_headrightsys.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2005).
200 See JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & ALFRED A, MOSS, JR., FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM 141 (2000)
(indicating that slaves were seen as irresponsible). Thus their oaths meant nothing and they could not
make contracts. Id.
201 Id. at 147-48.
202 Id. at 141, 144.
203 See id. (stating that although a slave could not strike a white person, even in self-defense, the
killing of a slave, however malicious, was rarely regarded as murder).
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political representation debate can change the fact that slaves were
property.2°
A second obstacle is the court system itself. Courts have clung to
the idea that the government is required to pay compensation only when it
has confiscated the entire bundle of sticks.20 5  This narrow interpretation
would allow the government to regulate away nearly all individual property
rights, without having an obligation to compensate the owner, even though
the owner now possesses only an empty title.20 6 This cannot be consistent
with the core purpose of the Just Compensation Clause. In fact, the
principles behind the Clause suggest that if property is a bundle of sticks,
then taking merely one stick lessens the property's value and something has
been taken from the owner. The inquiry that remains is not whether the taker
owes the owner for his loss, but how much the owner is owed for the
appropriation of his property. In regard to slavery, the federal government
appropriated the entire bundle, completely extinguishing the slaves' property
interests.
In addition, given the inalienable nature of the property right, and the
purpose of the Just Compensation Clause, it is unlikely that title to the
slaves' property right of self-ownership was transferred to the government.
Since the interest in the property was not voluntarily transferred, yet clearly
was taken, a taking resulted: the government confiscated all of the sticks
including life, liberty, and the benefit of one's labor.
2. Regulatory Taking
The regulatory takings doctrine allows compensation for regulations
that deprive an owner of a substantial amount of property value.207  First
recognized in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,2 °8 compensatory recovery
204 Recognizing slaves for the purpose of representation was a convenient tax compromise for the
heads of state at the Constitutional Convention. It is not indicative of their intention to render Blacks as
free, much less equal persons.
205 See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841-42 (concluding that if government action resulted in permanent
occupation of land, it would effect a taking unless it substantially furthered legitimate state interests);
CATO, supra note 196, at 8 (adopting a 100 percent rule and asking whether there has been a loss of
value before asking whether there has been a taking, which entitles an owner to compensation only if the
entire value has been lost).
206 CATO, supra note 196, at 8.
207 See MELTZ, supra note 166, at 137 ("The application of a generally zoning law to particular
property effects a taking is the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interest.. or
denies an owner economically viable use of his land....").
208 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). In Mahon, the Pennsylvania Coal Company
appealed the appellate court's decision in Mahon's favor in his suit to enjoin the company from mining
under his house and removing the supports, causing subsidence. Id. at 412. A deed granted Mahon the
surface rights to certain land but reserved to the company the right to mine all coal under the house. Id. at
394-95. Mahon argued that the Kohler Act extinguished the company's right to mine under his surface
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requires a regulation that affects property interests.20 9 Until Mahon, federal
courts only recognized physical takings claims.210 The Mahon Court restates
the general rule that although property may be regulated by the government,
regulations that go "too far" will be deemed a compensable taking.21' The
focus on going "too far" indicates the Court's intent to recognize partial
takings as opposed to complete appropriation. The Court's effort to expand
takings goes beyond that intended by the Framers. The drafters of the Bill of
Rights intended the Takings Clause to be limited only to the government's
physical seizure of private property.
212  The Court has admitted as much,
213
but has nonetheless continued to entertain regulatory takings claims.
The Supreme Court more clearly defined the issue in the Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. NYC2( 1 4 test as it attempted to distinguish
partial takings from government action that confiscates private property in its
entirety. The factors required to establish a complete taking are more
difficult to overcome given that the potential award will be more costly than
the award such a plaintiff could receive under a partial takings claim.
In allowing for compensation according to the Penn Central analysis,
the Court created a three part test for measuring regulatory takings: 1) the
economic impact of the regulation on the claimant; 2) the extent to which the
regulation has interfered with distinct, investment-backed expectations; and
3) the character of the governmental action.21  The regulatory framework
that facilitated slavery is one that qualifies as going too far,2t 6 fulfilling the
requirements of the Mahon test,2 ' and producing a partial taking. The
government's actions, however, also fulfill the requirements of the Penn
land. Id. at 412. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that although the company had valid
contractual and property rights, the Kohler Act was a valid exercise of police power. Id. The court thus
issued an injunction to prevent the coal company from mining under Mahon's surface land. Id. The U.S.
Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision, finding that the Kohler Act was not a legitimate
exercise of police power, Id. at 414, but rather was an unconstitutional taking of the company's
contractual and property rights because it served to take away those valid rights without adequate and just
compensation. Id. at 413.
209 See Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (stating that an ordinance affecting a property
interest is a taking if it does not substantially advance legitimate state interests).
210 MELTZ, supra note 166, at 119.
211 Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415-16 ("The general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated
to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.").
212 MELTZ, supra note 166, at 129.
213 Id. at 130.
214 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. NYC, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (holding there was no taking
after identifying the economic impact, the extent of interference with investment-backed expectations, and
the character of the government's action as the factors to be analyzed). The Court found no taking in this
case since the owners could still earn a reasonable return without the offices and the availability of
transferable development rights lessened the economic impact. Id. at 137.
215 Id. at 104.
216 See infra notes 142-164 and accompanying text (discussing the federal government's
responsibility for slavery).
217 Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415-16.
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Central test, producing a complete taking of the slaves' property interest in
their self-ownership.
Considering that slaves never have been compensated for the loss of
their property, the economic impact of the taking was and is currently
devastating. One can only imagine if a slave had been paid a mere fraction
of the value of her labor, it may have been feasible to buy freedom or at least
pay a slave owner to prevent the owner from selling members of a family.
Likewise, if slaves had been compensated and been able to save their money,
passing it from generation to generation to ensure the survival and well being
of their family members as Whites did, it is possible that modern vestiges of
slavery, discrimination, and cultural, political and economic destruction of
African-Americans at large, may have been prevented.
The government's activities speak directly to the character of the
government's action throughout the time period. In Penn Central, the Court
noted that in deciding whether a particular governmental action has affected
a taking, courts focus both on the character of the action and on the nature
and extent of the interference.218 From the act of capturing and shipping the
slaves to the daily control of their activities and the restriction of their rights,
the federal government paid only lip-service to the treaties and laws that
made the transportation of slaves from Africa illegal.219 In fact, only the
British committed substantial naval and political resources to stamping out
the illegal trade. 220 The United States did little and, until the Civil War,
actually obstructed the suppression of the slave trade by refusing to allow the
British to board and search American ships.22' Slave traders, whether
American or not, routinely used the American flag as a cover for their
222crimes.
The federal government's conduct toward African-Americans
constituted extreme behavior that sanctioned the enslavement of a race. The
beatings and lynchings, and threats of being beaten and lynched, were
prevalent throughout the slave era.22 3 These acts caused irreparable physical
218 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130.
219 Gaddis Smith, "The Amistad in a Global Maritime Context," The Connecticut Scholar:
Occasional Papers of the Connecticut Humanities Council (1992) no. 10: 37-43, http://amistad.mysticsea
port.org/discovery/themes/connscholar.92/smith.global.context.html (last visited Nov. 09, 2004); W. E. B.
Du BoIs, THE SUPPRESSION OF THE AFRICAN SLAVE-TRADE TO THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
1638-1870, at 1 (New York, Harvard Historical Studies 1 1896); WARREN S. HOWARD, AMERICAN
SLAVERS AND THE FEDERAL LAW, 1837-1862 (Berkeley, U. of California Press 1963).
220 Smith, supra note 219.
221 Id.
222 Id.
223 See ARNO PRESS & THE NEW YORK TIMES, THIRTY YEARS OF LYNCHING IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1889-1918, at 29 (William Katz ed., 1969) (citing 2,522 lynchings between these years); see
also ROBERT L. ZANGRANDO, THE NAACP CRUSADE AGAINST LYNCHING, 1909-1905, at 6-7 (1980)
(citing 4,742 lynchings between 1882 and 1968).
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harm and imminent apprehension of bodily harm and death. In addition, the
government perpetrated repeated acts of false imprisonment when it intended
to and did confine the slaves within fixed boundaries, directly confining
them while they were conscious of the confinement and were harmed by
it.224 The beginning of this imprisonment began with the initial capture and
transportation of Africans to the United States. This control over the slaves'
movement continued throughout plantation life.
This manner of treatment is facially outrageous, but even more so
beneath the surface because the government knew, or should have known,
that this treatment would cripple African-Americans socially and politically
thereafter for generations to come. Even after emancipation the federal
government allowed the states and private individuals to make concerted
efforts to deprive African-Americans of opportunities relating to education,
employment, voting, property ownership, and personal mobility. This
treatment was intended to, and had the ultimate effect of, subordinating
African-Americans to permanent second-class citizenship. African-
Americans have been indoctrinated with the belief that their culture, their
religion, their language, their political influence, and their basic existence are
inferior to that of Whites. The U.S. government created and continually
perpetrated the feeling of hopelessness.225
Reconstruction was the government's first attempt to correct the
wrongs it actively participated in creating and maintaining. This short-lived,
feeble effort was replaced with decades of "separate but equal" facilities and
Jim Crow laws,226 effectively destroying any benefits of Reconstruction.
Affirmative action, a system of being able to consider race in areas such as
higher education and job opportunities, took the place of legislated
discrimination, but has run into problems as well.22 7 Regardless of whether
224 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 35 (1965).
225 See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 543 (1896) (stating that a statute that implied
merely a legal distinction between differing races did not tend to destroy the legal equality of the two
races or to reestablish a state of involuntary servitude). There was no violation of the Thirteenth or
Fourteenth Amendments because the legislature was at liberty to act with reference to the established
usages, customs, and traditions of the people, and with a view to preserving public peace and good order.
Id. at 550.
226 See C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (commemorative ed. 2002)
(recounting the history of post-Civil War Jim Crow discrimination). A brutally cruel, repressive, and
exploitative system of racial subjugation, the Jim Crow system survived into the second half of the
twentieth century. Id.
227 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). Petitioner, the low bidder on a
federal contract, was denied the contract because a presumptive preference was given to minority business
entities; the petitioner sued, claiming violation of its Fifth Amendment Equal Protection rights. Id. at
205-06. The lower courts rejected the claim, relying upon precedent which subjected Equal Protection
claims to intermediate scrutiny. Id. at 210. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that a)
the petitioner could claim injury owing to a discriminatory classification which prevented it from
competing on an equal footing; b) the Fifth and Fourteenth Equal Protection claims are analyzed applying
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there were successful attempts to level the playing field, they cannot
substitute for the property already taken.228
In his dissent in San Diego Gas & Electric Co., Justice Brennan
refuted the proposition that once a regulatory taking has been established,
mere invalidation or amendment of the regulation is a constitutionally
sufficient remedy.229 Recognizing that the concept of just compensation is to
place the property owner in the same position monetarily as he would have
occupied if the property had not been taken,23° Justice Brennan declared that
invalidation or amendment of the regulation, unaccompanied by payment of
damages, does not compensate the owner for any economic loss suffered
during the time the invalid regulation was in effect.23 1 He proposed that once
a court finds that a regulation has effected a taking, the government entity
must pay just compensation for the period commencing on the date the
regulation first effected the taking and ending on the date the government
entity chooses to rescind or amend the regulation.232
The government-sponsored regulations destroyed all value that the
slaves originally held in their property; the magnitude of the taking and the
involuntary transfer of the ownership right to another rendered self-
ownership worthless by removing all beneficial economic use.233
3. Derivative Taking
Though the Supreme Court has never endorsed this particular theory,
a derivative taking occurs whenever a partial or complete taking diminishes
strict scrutiny analysis; and c) since the lower courts applied intermediate scrutiny, remand for strict
scrutiny analysis was required. Id. at 217-27; Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003). The university's
undergraduate admissions policy was based on a point system that automatically granted 20 points to
applicants from underrepresented minority groups. Id. at 252. This class-action equal protection suit
alleged racial discrimination. Id. The Court found that the policy made race the decisive factor for
virtually every minimally qualified underrepresented minority applicant. Id. at 271-72. As the policy
was not narrowly tailored to achieve respondents' asserted compelling interest in diversity, it violated the
Equal Protection Clause, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Id. at 275.
228 First English Evangelical, 482 U.S. at 320. "We merely hold that where the government's
activities have already worked a taking of all use of property, no subsequent action by the government can
relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for the period during which the taking was effective."
229 San Diego Gas, 450 U.S. at 653-54.
230 Id. at 657.
231 Id. at 655.
232 Id. at 658.
233 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). The South Carolina Supreme
Court found that the plaintiff could not recover for a taking violation. Id. at 1009-10. However, the U.S.
Supreme Court found that where all economic use had been lost, the action constituted a taking, requiring
compensation to the property owner. Id. 1014-19. The Court noted that a state may resist compensation
only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner's estate showed that the proscribed
use interests were not part of his title to begin with. Id. at 1027. In this case, the Court denied
compensation under the Takings Clause, remanding the case for the state supreme court to reconsider the
regulation's effect on the landowner's property value. Id. at 1022-23.
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234the value of surrounding property. Derivative takings allow third parties,
not directly affected by the regulation but harmed by the original taking
nonetheless, to recover damages.235 A derivative taking, a hybrid of both the
regulatory and physical takings, results from either a physical or regulatory
taking. 6  Proponents of derivative takings argue that a policy of not
compensating damage to third parties cannot be justified on either efficiency
or fairness grounds.237 Courts however, have consistently rejected derivative
takings claims, despite the fact that the federal and state governments would
be encouraged to exercise what is in essence eminent domain power only
when such use would enhance social utility.
238
In the case of slavery, the taking has led to institutionalized racism,
causing harm to subsequent generations of African-Americans. According to
recent census figures, 24.3% of Blacks lived in poverty in 2003, compared
with 10.3% of Whites. 239 Education statistics show that where only 78.7% of
Blacks have a high school diploma, 88.7% of Whites have obtained this level
of minimal achievement. 240 Likewise, only 17% of Blacks have obtained a
bachelor's degree or more, compared to 29.4% of Whites. 24' Black per-
capita income in 2001 was a mere $14,953 compared with $24,127 for
Whites.242 The percent of Blacks below the poverty level has more than
doubled that of Whites for the last 26 years.243 As would be expected given
the previous numbers, the percentage of unemployed Blacks more than
doubles that of Whites. More telling, however, is the difference between
those who do and do not own homes. In 2002, 47.3% of Blacks owned their
own homes.244 This does not begin to compare to the 74.5% of Whites who
245owned their own homes. Yet more disturbing are the incarceration
statistics. As of the year 2000, there were only 132 more Black males in
234 Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, Ill YALE L.J. 547, 550 (2001).
235 DAN DOBBS, I LAW OF REMEDIES, DAMAGES, EQUITY, RESTITUTION, PRACTITIONER
TREATISE SERIES § 3.11(9) (2d ed. 1993).
236 Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 234, at 550, 559.
237 Id. at 578-85.
238 See EPSTEIN, supra note 177, at 52 (noting that courts uniformly deny consequential damages
on the theory that the government did not take the consequentially lost items).
239 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, Historical Poverty Tables, Table 4: Percent of People in
Poverty, by Definition of Income and Selected Characteristics: 2002-2003, http://www.census.gov/hhes/
poverty/poverty03/table4.pdf (last visited Oct. 13, 2005).
240 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS Table 7: Educational Attainment of the Population 25 Years and
Over by Sex, and Race and Hispanic Origin: March 2002, http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/
race/Black/ppl-1 64/tab07.pdf (last visited Oct. 12, 2005).
241 Id.
242 N.Y. TIMES 2004 ALMANAC 624 (Beth Rowen ed., 2003).
243 Id. at 627. Between 1975 and 2001, the percent of Blacks below the poverty level ranged
between 31.3% and 22.7%. For whites, although the number reached a high of 11.4% in the mid-
nineteen-eighties, they averaged a mere 9.8% otherwise.
24 Id. at 624.
245 Id. at 181.
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college than in prison.246 While the number of Black males attending college
has risen only slightly, the number going to prison has increased dramatically
over the years.247 In addition, Black males are more than six times more
likely than White males to go to prison.248 The Department of Justice notes
that in 2000, Blacks had a 18.6% chance of going to prison, compared with a
3.4% chance for Whites.249
Blacks trail Whites with regard to every social yardstick including
education, life expectancy, income, and homeownership. These disparities
are linked to the legacy of slavery. It is of no consequence to argue which
came first, slavery or racism. The result has been the reinforced presumption
that African-Americans are inferior, unintelligent, and prone to violence and
crime. These disparities stem from the original taking.
V. History of Compensation
In recent history, various racial groups have been compensated for
harms suffered at the hands of the U.S. government. Most notably, Native
Americans have been compensated for the theft and destruction of their
property that occurred at the turn of the century.250 This compensation,
although not a direct cash payment and not explicitly cited as necessary for
current retribution for past wrongs, is nonetheless an acknowledgment of the
federal government's guilt and acceptance of responsibility. Government
documents, however, make clear that the financial assistance, most popularly
in the form of free or nearly free higher education, but also in tax breaks,251
246 PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE, AFRICAN-AMERICAN MALE POPULATIONS, 2000, http://www.
prisonpolicy.org/graphs/Blackmalepop.shtml (last visited Mar. 12, 2005)
247 PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE, INCREASES IN THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN MALE POPULATIONS,
1980-2000, http://www.prison-policy.org/graphs/Blackpopincreases.shtml (last visited Mar. 12, 2005).
248 PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE, INCARCERATED MALES, BY RACE, http://www.prisonpolicy.org/
graphs/malesinc.shtml (last visited Mar. 12, 2005).
249 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
CRIMINAL OFFENDERS STATISTICS, LIFETIME LIKELIHOOD OF GOING TO STATE OR FEDERAL PRISON,
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/crimoff.htm#lifetime (last revised Dec. 8, 2004).
250 If enrolled in a federally recognized tribe, there are some colleges that offer a free education.
The student first files the FAFSA and then applies to a college that is sponsored by the particular tribe.
INTER-TRIBAL COUNCIL OF MICHIGAN, INC., http://www.itcmi.org/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2005);
UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA, http://www.mrs.umn.edu/services/msp/exempt.htm (last visited Oct. 12,
2005); MASSACHUSETTS COMMISSION ON INDIAN AFFAIRS, http://www.mass.gov/dhcd/components/
IndAffairs/page5.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2005); NATIVE AMERICAN RIGHTS FUND, http://www.narf.
org/nill/resources/education/BLUE/e.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2005).
251 Native American Indian tribes are not among the entities made taxable under the Internal
Revenue Code. Accordingly, federally recognized tribes are exempt from federal income taxation. See
Rev. Rul. 67-284, 1967-2 C.B. 55 (showing that although there is no general exemption from federal
income taxation for Native American individuals, some tax exemptions in favor of Native American
individuals may be found in treaties and statutes); see also DAVID H. GETCHES, ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN
LAW 656-57 (3d ed. 1998); Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1956) (holding that income derived
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252available for "eligible" Native Americans is not an entitlement program.
Surprisingly, there are no comparable programs for other minorities. If the
education "scholarship" were the same as any other federal financial aid
program for those showing financial need, why require that the applicant
have a certain percentage of Native American blood or be on a tribe's
membership roster? The language itself indicates that the Native Americans
have been identified as a group receiving special services as a result of their
being Native American.253
Significantly, Native Americans have been permitted to recover
where other victims of government brutality were not due to courts'
recognition of a fiduciary duty that exists between the government and the
tribes. In at least one case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
considered and subsequently rejected any attempt by African-American
plaintiffs to situate themselves in the same or similar relationship as Native
254Americans to the U.S. government.
Native Americans have been successful in gaining the right to sue
the government and have obtained monetary and non-monetary relief as a
result of their suit.255  The Cato court acknowledged that regardless of
whether there are factual similarities between the treatment accorded Indian
Tribes and African-American slaves and their descendants, there is nothing
in the relationship between the United States and African-American slaves
and their descendants that is legally comparable to the unique relationship
between the U.S. federal government and Indian Tribes.256 The court noted
that other courts have recognized a fiduciary responsibility running from the
government to Indian Tribes because of specific treaty obligations and a
from allotted lands held by the federal government in trust for an individual tribe member is excluded
from income and therefore not subject to taxation); Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515
U.S. 450, 458 (1995) ("[A] State is without power to tax reservation lands and reservation Indians.").
252 BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF INDIAN EDUCATION PROGRAMS, http://www.oiep.
bia.edu/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2005).
253 Id. (Applicants must "[b]e a member of, or at least one-quarter degree Indian blood
descendent of a member of an American Indian tribe who are eligible for the special programs and
services provided by the United States through the Bureau of Indian Affairs to Indians because of their
status as Indians").
254 See Cato, 70 F.3d at 1108 (finding Cato's analogy to Indian land claim cases unpersuasive, and
stating that the court's willingness to entertain the Oneida's suit was not based on a prohibition, but on the
trustee relationship that exists between the government and the Indian tribes).
255 See Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 307-08 (1942) (reversing the lower
courts dismissal of the Nation's petition and remanding for consideration of the government's fiduciary
duty to the Nation); Oneida Indian Nation, 691 F.2d at 1083-84 (holding that the Nations claims required
further proceedings considering the Nation's claim could not be time barred since the government
explicitly provided for the late filing and finding that the government was not immune from suit); United
States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 226 (1983) (holding that the timber management statutes and various
other statutes and regulations could be fairly interpreted to mandate compensation by the government for
violation of its fiduciary responsibilities in the management of Native American property).
256 Cato, 70 F.3d at 1108.
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257
network of statutes that impose specific duties on the government. This
unique relationship has extended statutes of limitations that would have
otherwise barred claims against the government,258 and has allowed for
monetary relief where otherwise only injunctive relief would have been
permitted.259
African-Americans are unable to point to any such treaties or statutes
that require a similar obligation or create such exceptions. Fortunately,
African-Americans do not need to establish any such relationship given the
self-executing nature of the Takings Clause.
Nationally, President Clinton apologized to indigenous Hawaiians
for the illegal United States-aided overthrow of the sovereign nation's local
government and the near decimation of traditional Hawaiian culture that
followed; 260 the Methodist Church apologized to Native Americans in
Wyoming for the 1865 post-treaty slaughter at the hands of the U.S. cavalry
led by a Methodist minister;26' the Florida legislature awarded reparations to
survivors of the Rosewood massacre;262 the federal government offered an
apology to the African-American victims of the Tuskegee syphilis
experiment,263 and agreed to apologize to and provide limited reparations for
Japanese Latin Americans kidnapped from Latin American countries and
placed in U.S. internment camps as hostages during WWII.
264
The Japanese survivors and descendants of the Japanese-American
WWII internment victims based their reparations case primarily on a legal
strategy that couched their claims in an individual rights context and focused
on tolling or otherwise avoiding the statute of limitations.265 Specifically, 1)
257 Id.
258 See Oneida Indian Nation, 691 F.2d at 1983-84 (affirming the dismissal of defendant's
assertions that plaintiffs' claim were time barred, as the federal government explicitly provided for the late
filing of Indian property right actions).
259 See Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 216-26 (stating that the Tucker Act did not create a substantive right
enforceable for monetary damages, but that the timber management statutes, used to regulate government
use of timber on reservations, can be fairly interpreted as mandating compensation by the government for
damages sustained).
260 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, RECONCILIATION AT A CROSSROADS: THE IMPLICATIONS OF
THE APOLOGY RESOLUTION AND Rice v. Cayetano FOR FEDERAL AND STATE PROGRAMS BENEFITING
NATIVE HAWAIIANS, http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/sac/hi06Ol/pref.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2005).
261 Dinah Shelton, The World of Atonement Reparations for Historical Injustices, Miskolc
International Journal of Law, Vol. 1 (2004) No. 2, pp. 259-89, available at http://www.uni-
miskolc.hu/-wwwdrint/20042sheltonl .htm#_ tnl (last visited Oct. 17, 2005).
262 Race with History, Rosewood Reborn, 1923 and After, http://www.racewithistory.org/htmlU
bcwcr.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2005).
263 Brandt Williams, The Case for Slavery Reparations, http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/
features/200011/13_williamsb reparations! (Nov. 13, 2000).
264 Japanese Latin Americans Imprisoned During World War 11 Win Bittersweet Victory from
Department of Justice, http://www.aclu-sc.org/News/Releases/I 998/100003/ (June 12, 1998).
265 Eric K. Yamamoto, Racial Reparations: Japanese American Redress and African-American
Claims, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 477, 490 (1998).
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their challenge addressed a specific executive order and ensuing military
orders; 2) their challenge was based on then-existing constitutional norms
(due process and equal protection); and 3) both a congressional commission
and the courts identified specific facts amounting to violations of those
norms. Furthermore, the claimants (those who had been interned and were
still living) and the government agents (specific military and Justice and War
Department Officials) were both easily identifiable as individuals. These
agents' wrongful acts resulted directly in the imprisonment of (and thus
injury to) innocent people. The damages to these people, although uncertain,
covered a fixed time and were limited to survivors, and the payment of these
damages meant finality.2 6
The descendants of the Japanese-Americans interned during WWII
have been monetarily compensated twice within the last fifteen years for the
266
loss of their property.267 In 1948, President Harry S. Truman signed the
Japanese American Evacuation Claims Act allowing reimbursements.268
Some 23,689 claims were filed asking for $131,949,176.269 By the time
these claims outlasted federal procedures which required itemized claims and
receipts, the federal government recompensed Japanese Americans
$38,000,000 or about 29 cents for every dollar claimed. 7° On September 17,
1987, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a law including a formal
apology to Japanese Americans for the internment and providing $1.2 billion
in compensation.27'
The plight of the slaves' descendants is most similar to that of the
Korean women who filed suit in the Tokyo District Court2 72 against the
Japanese government for crimes during WWII. 273 Between 1932 and 1945,
Japan forced Korean women into slavery and prostitution in Manchuria,
China, the Philippines, and Thailand, among other regions of the Pacific.274
The resulting experience of this treatment was similar to that experienced by
African-Americans after abolition: discrimination, higher unemployment,
266 Id.
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fewer educational opportunities, substandard housing and political
oppression.275
Most recently, the Japanese government awarded these women
reparations.276 Their legal strategy, arguing that Japan violated international
law by perpetrating crimes against humanity, 277 is unlike those of the
Japanese-American internees, but presents a viable possibility for African-
Americans who suffer as a result of the treatment of their ancestors.
Holocaust survivors have been the most successful in gaining, not
only apologies, but also monetary compensation for their experience as
forced laborers and slave laborers. The sources of the reparation funds have
come from not only Germany, but also from banks and private and
government-owned companies spanning the four corners of Europe.278
VI. Conclusion
Reparations offer the country a unique opportunity to reconstruct
fractured communities. It is necessary to acknowledge the ongoing
inequities and create a workable plan to restore to African-Americans their
rightful place in society. It is not conducive or even recommended that the
process attempt to lay blame; reparations is a moral obligation that we all
share to take care of those who have suffered. The perpetuation of pain as a
direct result of slavery and discrimination taints us all. And yet, coming to
grips with injustice is not easy. However, it is not justice's duty to make
reconciliation palatable. There is no doubt that reparations must be the result
of America's struggle with a problem that is older than the nation itself. And
there can be no doubt that the U.S. owes a debt to the descendants of those
who were the backbone of the nation's growth.
The Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause mandates the federal
government pay for private property that it commandeers without the
permission of the property owner. Slaves lost the value of their labor, and
more importantly, the value of their self-ownership. As a result, their
surviving descendants and African-Americans at large continue to suffer
from the vestiges of slavery that manifest in modern day society's treatment
of the race. In acknowledging the wrongs, a Takings Clause argument
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creates a kinder, more gentle and reasonable approach to the idea of repairing
the damage and expands the possibilities for conversation and debate in the
process of attaining just compensation.

